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The triggers of competitiveness:
The EFIGE cross-country report
There is a pressing need for Europe to grow out of the crisis, meaning that
Europe needs to become more competitive, enabling it to capture growth cur-
rently taking place mainly in emerging markets. But what are the triggers of
competitiveness? The EFIGE project, led by Bruegel, takes a fresh look by
inquiring into the determinants of firm-level international performance – focus-
ing on external competitiveness. In the competitiveness debate, it is crucial to
understand not only the macroeconomic challenge, but also to find the right
micro-level triggers that will generate growth and exports.
The authors identify firm-level total factor productivity as a major determinant of
growth and exports. Human capital, research, equity finance and performance-
based incentives for employees also play their parts. Moreover, size matters
and large firms typically are much better exporters than their smaller counter-
parts. This report builds on previous EFIGE research and studies in depth firm
performance in seven countries (Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy,
Spain and the United Kingdom) to identify the triggers of competitiveness. 
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Foreword
What are the factors that will trigger the competitiveness of European ﬁrms? The
authors of this study have worked intensively for three years on the question, as part
of a large, Bruegel-headed research project on the topic, called European Firms in the
Global Economy – EFIGE – mostly funded by a European Commission research grant.
In this framework, Bruegel has also commissioned a major survey covering 15,000
ﬁrms in seven European countries. The survey is the ﬁrst comparable dataset of its
kind in Europe, and as such it forms the basis of the research project. This study thus
brings together a great deal of the evidence arising from EFIGE .
The debate on competitiveness has shifted signiﬁcantly in recent years because of
the massive crisis in the euro area. In fact competitiveness is now considered a key
factor for the adjustment in the euro area. Macroeconomic data indeed shows that in
the run-up to the crisis, huge capital ﬂows fundamentally altered the structure of our
economies with a signiﬁcantly increased tradable sector in some countries and an
overblown non-tradable sector in others. The sudden stop of these capital ﬂows has left
countries severely exposed and adjustment to a new growth model has been slow and
fraught, with major increases in unemployment and relatively limited price and wage
adjustment visible in the national account data. On the other hand, in some cases,
export performance has been spectacular during the crisis years. For example, Spanish
export performance has been one of the euro area’s strongest. Yet, high unemployment
testiﬁes to the unﬁnished adjustment agenda in Spain.
Against this background, this study takes a fresh look by inquiring into the deter -
minants of ﬁrm-level international performance, that is external competitiveness. In
fact, in the competitiveness debate, it is of crucial importance to understand not only
the macroeconomic challenge but also to search for the right policy response that will
generate growth and exports. This can be found at the ﬁrm level. A number of new
results emerge. Firm-level total factor productivity is clearly identiﬁed as a crucial
determinant of growth and exports. Human capital, R&D, equity ﬁnance and
performance-based incentives for employees also underpin the success of ﬁrms.
ix
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Moreover, size matters and large ﬁrms typically are much better exporters than their
smaller counterparts.
A number of important policy conclusions can be drawn from the analysis. Central for
the promotion of export growth is setting the right conditions for firms to grow and
export. It is crucial to remove incentives for ﬁrms to stay small. Important factors
hampering ﬁrm growth are taxes and social and labour regulation. But lack of access
to ﬁnance also often limits growth. And indeed, one of the most dangerous side-eﬀects
of the current sovereign debt crisis is that the ﬁnancial system in Europe is
fragmenting, putting a break on credit as well as equity ﬁnance, in particular in crisis
countries. Equity ﬁnance has always been weak in Europe compared to the United
States and this may explain the less dynamic European corporate sector. Finally, all the
standard recommendations about R&D and education are conﬁrmed by this rich
microeconometric research.
Adjustment in the euro area will require very comprehensive relative price changes. In
the absence of nominal exchange rates, wage and product price inﬂation need to adjust
to create conditions for jobs and growth. Yet, this study reminds us that lasting external
competitiveness needs to be underpinned by the right policies for corporations.
Microeconomic data sets and research of the kind employed in this study are crucial
to deﬁne the right policy set. All too often, policy makers ignore the rich potential that
microeconomic research oﬀers them. I am therefore very grateful to the authors for
this very timely, thought provoking and rich report, and I hope that the availability of
larger and more comprehensive datasets of this kind will stimulate the debate in
Europe and abroad.
Guntram B. Wolff, Deputy Director of Bruegel
July 2012
EFIGE CROSS-COUNTRY REPORT FOREWORD
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Executive summary
The ability to ‘grow out’ of the crisis is now widely recognised as the only long-term
viable option for the sustainability of the European Union and its social market
economy model. Enhanced ‘competitiveness’ at the EU level is required, which would
allow the EU to capture growth currently taking place mainly in emerging markets.
While the consensus on the need to foster competitiveness is almost unanimous, the
debate on how to deﬁne and measure it is still open, especially when the focus is kept
at the country level. Diﬀerent (often complementary) approaches are available and
their relative advantages depend on several factors, in particular the level of detail at
which data is available (eg country, industry or ﬁrm/product level).
Though aware of this debate, this Blueprint goes further than the existing set of com -
petitive ness indicators, recognising from the outset that it is not really countries that
exchange goods and services, but rather ﬁrms located in each country. We therefore
look at the issue through the lens of ﬁrm performance. Driven by the policy debate, we
also focus on a speciﬁc dimension of competitiveness, that is external or inter national
competitiveness, deﬁned as the ability to exchange the goods (and services) in which
a country is abundant for the goods and services that in the same country are scarce. 
We ﬁnd that the external competitiveness of a country is indeed determined by the
aggregate ability of individual ﬁrms to operate successfully in international markets:
in other words, assessing the external competitiveness of the EU amounts to
identifying what drives the ability of European ﬁrms to compete successfully in
international markets.
As suggested by recent economic literature, our working hypothesis is that external
competitiveness is an expression of high ﬁrm-level productivity. A growing body of
evidence points to the fact that the aggregate performance of a country or an industry
strongly depends on ﬁrm-level factors (size, organisation, technological capacity and
their ability to successfully operate in international markets), which are ultimately
related to ﬁrm-level productivity.
1
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This Blueprint thus takes a ‘bottom up’ approach and discusses the ways in which
international exposure and productivity interact at the ﬁrm level, eventually
determining the external competitiveness of European countries. We capitalise on the
ﬁrst existing harmonised cross-country dataset (EFIGE) that measures the entire range
of international activities (imports, exports, foreign direct investment (FDI),
international outsourcing) of ﬁrms in seven European countries (Austria, France,
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom). We are also able to link these
international activities to the same ﬁrms’ balance-sheet data as retrieved from the
Bureau Van Dijk’s Amadeus dataset. Thus we can correlate measurements of
productivity with ﬁrms’ international exposure. In particular, we compare a number of
ﬁrm-level productivity measures, namely total factor productivity (TFP), labour
productivity (LP) and unit labour costs (ULC), with the latter being the measure
typically used as the basis for the analysis of competitiveness at the country level.
After controlling for country and industry characteristics, we ﬁnd that international
exposure is indeed positively correlated with our measurements of productivity at the
ﬁrm level. Moreover, when measured by labour productivity or TFP (as economic theory
would suggest), productivity is also positively correlated with the complexity of ﬁrms’
internationalisation strategies, with complex activities (FDI) more associated with
higher productivity than simpler activities (imports or exports). Outsourcing, which
typically involves an intermediate level of complexity, is associated with the middle of
the productivity range.
Such a correlation, however, holds to a lesser extent when productivity is measured in
terms of (the inverse of) ULC. The reason is that LP exhibits a strong positive correlation
with TFP, whereas the correlation between the inverse of ULC and TFP, though positive,
is much weaker, mainly due (at least in our data) to the diﬀerent structure of labour
costs in innovating ﬁrms, thus underlining the importance of quality and other non-
price determinants for competitiveness. This ﬁnding suggests that while ULC
measurements can be appropriately informative for an initial macro-policy assessment
of a country’s competitiveness, an in-depth study of the sources of competitiveness,
and the resulting recommendations on how policy can tap those sources, requires an
analysis of ﬁrm-level TFP dynamics similar to the one we put forward in this Blueprint.
In particular, starting from the ﬁnding that more complex internationalisation strategies
generate higher costs, and thus require greater productivity for proﬁts to be
maintained, this Blueprint identiﬁes the characteristics of those ﬁrms that are able,
over time, to move from below to above the minimum performance threshold (or
‘productivity cut-oﬀ’) required to become active in the international environment. In
EFIGE CROSS-COUNTRY REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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other words, we identify which ﬁrm-level factors matter more in driving the growth in
the productivity of European ﬁrms in order to trigger their international activities.
The wealth of EFIGE data allows us to show that, even in diferent European countries,
the ability of ﬁrms to grow above the productivity cut-oﬀ is triggered by similar ‘growth-
friendly’ characteristics at the ﬁrm-level related to innovation (human capital and R&D
intensity), ﬁnance (adequate capital in the form of equity), human resources and
management (the use of performance-based salaries and a reduced presence of
managers belonging to the family, if the ﬁrm is family owned), and ownership
structures (aﬃliation to a foreign group).
Firms with the right balance of these characteristics are able to grow and become
successful internationally. In doing so, they become larger than the average domestic
ﬁrm (140 versus 31 employees in our sample). Firms that do not strike that balance
remain small and domestic, thus not contributing to their country’s external
competitiveness. These ﬁndings are consistent in diﬀerent countries and industries.
They also hold for diﬀerent productivity levels: all ﬁrms that become more productive
share similar characteristics, irrespective of their starting point. 
From a policymaking perspective, these ﬁndings have several implications:
• If the objective of policy is to foster a country’s competitiveness, the ultimately ﬁrm-
driven nature of this process is such that aggregate measures of competitiveness
are subject to a number of biases that have to be appropriately taken into account
when interpreting aggregate statistics: there is no ‘average’ ﬁrm, rather, ﬁrms are
very heterogeneous within countries and industries. As a result, rather than
formulating policies in an eﬀort to increase the competitiveness of the average ﬁrm,
it is much more eﬃcient to stimulate competitiveness by fostering the reallocation
of economic activities from less to more eﬃcient ﬁrms.
• Among the comparable ﬁrm-level measures currently available thanks to EFIGE, the
single best predictor of a ﬁrm’s ability to successfully operate in international
markets is its total factor productivity (TFP). 
• Successful international companies invest in human capital and R&D, rely on equity
ﬁnance, motivate their human resources through performance-based incentives,
do not necessarily loathe family ownership but do draw a line between the family
owner and the ﬁrm’s management, and do not see foreign capital as an intrusion
but rather thrive on the synergies it creates and the international opportunities it
EFIGE CROSS-COUNTRY REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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opens up, via both imports and exports, and in general the participation in global
value chains.
• Small is not beautiful per se. It is true that a signiﬁcant part of employment and
productivity growth comes from small ﬁrms. However, these are not any small ﬁrms.
They are, instead, ﬁrms that start small and, in the process of getting bigger, become
more productive and start to hire more employees. In this respect, the key question
for policy aimed at small and medium-sized companies should not be how to help
small ﬁrms to survive as they are, but should rather be how to help small ﬁrms adopt
the right attributes that promote not only survival but also growth.
• In particular, this report suggests that speciﬁc incentives (both market- and
government-based) should be created in the areas of innovation (eg tax credit
schemes for R&D expenditures), ﬁnance (eg via the liberalisation and simpliﬁcation
of a cross-border pan European market for private equity and venture capital),
human resources (eg promoting lifelong training programmes and securing an
improvement in national education systems), management (eg via a better link
between wages and productivity), and ownership (fostering the attraction of foreign
investment and the participation of domestic ﬁrms in global value chains).
• More in general, the promotion of productivity growth and competitiveness can and
should go beyond the traditional exercise of educated guesswork, targeting instead
the speciﬁc structural aspects that make ﬁrms inclined to acquire the ‘right’ set of
characteristics, beyond the worn-out generic mantra of ‘ﬂexibilities versus rigidities’.
Such an approach, still popular in policy circles, is hardly justiﬁable in the era of
ﬁrm-level data.
EFIGE CROSS-COUNTRY REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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1. The so-called Excessive Imbalances Procedure, based on Article 121.6 of the Treaty.
1 Introduction and overview 
of results
The ability to ‘grow out’ of the crisis is widely recognised as the only long-term viable
option for the sustainability of the European Union and its model of social market
economy. This requires enhanced ‘competitiveness’ at EU level, which in turn would
allow the EU to ‘capture’ growth that is currently taking place, mainly in emerging
markets.
While the consensus on the need to foster competitiveness is almost unanimous, the
debate on how to deﬁne and measure it is still open, especially when the focus is kept
at the country level. Diﬀerent (often complementary) approaches are available and
their relative advantages depend on several factors, such as the objective of the
analysis (eg policy making, academic research) or on the level of detail at which data
is available (eg country, industry or ﬁrm/product level). While aware of this debate, in
this report we leave it in the background, and focus on a speciﬁc dimension of
competitiveness, which we call external competitiveness, deﬁned as a country’s ability
to exchange the goods (and services) in which it is abundant for goods and services
that it lacks. This deﬁnition can be broadly connected to the international performance
of a country, and thus linked to some of the aggregate competitiveness indicators
(export share, current account, unit labour costs) used by the European institutions for
the the screening of potential imbalances emerging across the EU1.
With respect to this existing set of indicators, our report recognises from the outset
that it is not really the country that exchanges those goods and services, but rather its
ﬁrms. We, therefore, look at the issue through the lense of ﬁrm performance, knowing
that the external competitivess of a country is determined by the aggregation of
individual ﬁrms’ ability to operate successfully in international markets. In other words,
we try to identify what drives the ability of European ﬁrms to compete successfully in
international markets.
5
1852 Blueprint XVII pp i-x,1-68 - 18.7.12  18/7/12  11:47  Page 5
2. See, for instance, Behrens et al (2011) for a survey of the literature.
3. In this sense, ‘competitiveness’ is just ‘a poetic way of saying productivity’ (Krugman, 1997).
4. For additional details and updates on the project, see www.eﬁge.org.
5. Throughout the paper, ‘industry’ refers to the manufacturing industries of NACE Rev. 1 classiﬁcation at two-digit
level of aggregation. The terms ‘industry’ and ‘sector’ are used interchangeably.
Building on the emerging consensus in academic and policy circles, our working
hypothesis is that external competitiveness is an expression of high firm-level
productivity. Indeed, recent economic literature has increasingly underlined and
shown empirically that the aggregate performance of a country or an industry strongly
depends on ﬁrm-level factors, such as size, organisation, technological capacity and
other conditions that ﬁrms are confronted with in their speciﬁc environments, not least
their ability to successfully operate on international markets2. These factors are
themselves inherently related to ﬁrm-level productivity3.
Our report takes a bottom-up approach and discusses the ways through which
international exposure and productivity interact at the ﬁrm level, eventually
determining the external competitiveness of European countries. In so doing, we
capitalise on the EU-EFIGE/Bruegel-UniCredit dataset (from now on the EFIGE dataset),
which has recently become available thanks to the EFIGE project, coordinated by
Bruegel and ﬁnanced by the European Commission and UniCredit within the EU’s 7th
Framework Programme4. This dataset is unique in that it allows for a comparison of
ﬁrms’ international activities, both across a large set of internationalisation activities
and across key EU countries. Moreover, the EFIGE dataset can be matched with
balance-sheet information available from the Amadeus dataset of Bureau van Dijk,
thus allowing for the calculation of a number of productivity measures over time.
We exploit this wealth of information to correlate ﬁrm productivity with the entire range
of ﬁrms’ international activities (imports, exports, foreign direct investment (FDI),
international outsourcing) in seven European countries (Austria, France, Germany,
Hungary, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom). In particular, we compare a number of
ﬁrm-level productivity measures, namely total factor productivity (TFP), labour
productivity (LP) and unit labour costs (ULC), with the latter being the measure
typically used as the basis for analysis of ‘competitiveness’ at country level. Our aim
is to check if and to what extent ﬁrms involved in the various types of inter -
nationalisation activities are more productive, however productivity is measured,
compared to ﬁrms that are internationally inactive.
After controlling for country and industry characteristics5, we ﬁnd that international
exposure is indeed positively correlated with our measures of productivity at ﬁrm level.
EFIGE CROSS-COUNTRY REPORT INTRODUCTION
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6. See Appendix 5 for a detailed analysis of ﬁrm-level ULCs vs. TFP and their relationship to external competitiveness.
Moreover, when measured by TFP (as economic theory would suggest) or LP,
productivity is also positively correlated with the complexity of ﬁrms’
internationalisation strategies, with complex activities (FDI) being more associated
with higher productivity than simpler activities (imports or exports). Outsourcing, which
typically entails an intermediate level of complexity, is associated with the middle of
the productivity range. There is less correlation, however, when productivity is
measured in terms of (the inverse of) ULC. The reason is that LP exhibits a strong
positive correlation with TFP, whereas the correlation between the inverse of ULC and
TFP, though positive, is much weaker, mainly due (at least in our data) to the diﬀerent
structures of labour costs in innovating ﬁrms6. The latter ﬁnding suggests that while
ULC measures can be appropriately informative for an initial macro-policy assessment
of a country’s competitiveness, an in-depth examination of the origin of this
competitiveness, as well as the policy suggestions that might result, requires an
analysis of ﬁrm-level TFP dynamics.
The positive correlation between ﬁrm productivity and international activity is in line
with the general ﬁndings of the literature (see Behrens et al, 2011, for a survey) and
the evidence on the ‘happy few’ internationalised ﬁrms already discussed in Mayer
and Ottaviano (2007). This report both reinforces and enriches these ﬁndings and
evidence, thanks to its novel analysis of harmonised cross-country data over a greater
range of international activities. The new evidence provided in this report, of a
systematic relationship between international complexity and productivity, has the
same origins as the ‘happy few’ eﬀect, namely that more complex internationalisation
strategies entail higher costs. This conﬁrms the existence of additional complexity-
driven costs that internationalising ﬁrms have to face, with only ﬁrms that are
suﬃciently productive able to bear them. In this respect, internationalisation in its
various forms, and thus the ability to successfully compete in international markets,
requires ﬁrms to make a quantum leap in terms of productivity, overcoming a minimum
performance threshold induced by the additional costs of internationalisation.
From a policy perspective, it is therefore crucial to identify the characteristics of those
ﬁrms that are able, over time, to move from below to above the minimum performance
threshold (or ‘productivity cut-oﬀ’), which is required for them to become competitive
in the international environment. In other words, it is important to identify which ﬁrm-
level factors might matter more in driving the growth of productivity of European ﬁrms
that will trigger their international activities. Such identiﬁcation is only possible thanks
to the wealth of the EFIGE dataset. Indeed, the analysis shows that the ability to grow
EFIGE CROSS-COUNTRY REPORT INTRODUCTION
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above the productivity cut-oﬀ is triggered by precise ﬁrm characteristics. These are
related to innovation (human capital and R&D intensity), ﬁnance (adequate capital in
the form of equity), human resources and management (the use of performance-
based salaries and a reduced presence of managers belonging to the family if owning
the ﬁrm), and ownership structures (the aﬃliation to a foreign group). In our data, ﬁrms
moving over time above the cut-oﬀ are relatively small (an average of 34 employees
vs. a sample average of 126) but possess all the right attributes: they are more likely
to be well capitalised, to undertake R&D, to pay workers on the basis of performance,
to employ higher human capital, while they are less likely to be managed by family
members and less likely to request credit from banks.
Hence, internationalisation is the outcome of productivity growth and productivity
growth is itself triggered by striking the right balance among a well-deﬁned set of
factors concerning the way a ﬁrm is managed. Firms that strike the right balance grow
and become successful international actors, along the way reaching a larger size than
the average domestic ﬁrm (140 vs. 31 employees). Firms that do not strike that
balance remain small and domestic, thus not contributing to their country’s external
competitiveness. These ﬁndings consistently hold across countries and industries.
They also hold across productivity levels: all ﬁrms growing in productivity share similar
characteristics irrespective of their starting level (see Appendix 4).
From a policy viewpoint, our ﬁndings have several implications.
First, while our focus on external competitiveness has left the general debate on how
to best deﬁne and measure ‘competitiveness’ in the background, our ﬁndings still
suggest that deﬁnitions and measures on which policymakers base their decisions
have to be context-speciﬁc if those decisions have to be informed. In particular, our
results show that, if the aim is to foster a country’s ability to exchange goods and
services in which a country is abundant against goods and services that are scarce in
the same country, the ultimately ﬁrm-level driven nature of this process is such that
aggregate measures of competitiveness are subject to a number of biases, and thus
are likely to lead to imprecise policy prescriptions unless they are complemented by
information on how ﬁrms actually work and react to incentives.
Second, and related to that, the single best predictor of a ﬁrm’s ability to successfully
operate in international markets is its Total Factor Productivity (TFP). Hence, ﬁrm
productivity growth and not internationalisation per se (eg via export promotion
policies) should be the bullseye of the policy dartboard.
EFIGE CROSS-COUNTRY REPORT INTRODUCTION
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Third, ﬁrm productivity growth is triggered by the combination of a precise set of ﬁrm
characteristics relating to innovation, ﬁnance, human resources, management and
ownership. More than others, ﬁrms that successfully grow to become international
players invest in human capital and R&D intensity, rely on equity ﬁnance, motivate
their human resources through performance-based incentives, do not necessarily
loathe family ownership but do draw a line between the family owner and
management, and do not see foreign capital as undesirable but rather thrive on the
synergies it creates and the international opportunities it opens up, via both imports
and exports, and in general via the participation in global value chains.
Fourth, small is not beautiful per se. It is true that a signiﬁcant fraction of employment
and productivity growth comes from small ﬁrms. However, these are not just any small
ﬁrms. They are, instead, ﬁrms that start small and, in the process of getting bigger,
become more productive and start hiring more employees. In this respect, the key
question for SMEs policies should not be how to help small ﬁrms to survive as they
are, but should rather be how to make small ﬁrms adopt the right attitudes that promote
not only survival but also growth. In other words, small is beautiful if it grows, and this
does not happen when small is not accompanied by the right set of growth-friendly
attributes described above.
Fifth, policymakers should identify the speciﬁc institutional constraints that make
their countries’ ﬁrms shy away from the foregoing growth-friendly approach. If one
takes ﬁrms’ attitudes as immutable innate attributes, then the promotion of
productivity growth and competitiveness can only be seen as a compensating
mechanism against the side eﬀects of an unfortunately merciless but still necessary
process of Darwinian selection in the market, in which the ‘weak’ (both workers and
ﬁrms) give ground to the ‘strong’ for the superior goal of the survival of the species. In
reality the market is not deterministic: policy shapes the environment in which ﬁrms
operate and ﬁrms react to policies (as their incentives are changed) by reoptimising
their behavior, so their attitudes are not immutable. From this point of view, the
promotion of productivity growth and competitiveness should go beyond the logic of
mere compensation (subsidies), targeting instead the speciﬁc institutional aspects
that make ﬁrms inclined to acquire the described right set of characteristics, beyond
the worn-out generic mantra of ‘ﬂexibilities vs. rigidities’. In particular, this report
suggests that speciﬁc incentives (both market- and government-based) should be
created in the areas of innovation (eg tax credit schemes for R&D expenditures),
ﬁnance (eg via the liberalisation and simpliﬁcation of a cross-border pan European
market for private equity and venture capital), human resources (eg promoting lifelong
training programmes and an improvement of national education systems),
EFIGE CROSS-COUNTRY REPORT INTRODUCTION
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management (eg via a better link between wages and productivity), and ownership
(fostering the attraction of foreign investment and the participation of domestic ﬁrms
in global value chains). As cross-country comparisons are crucial for a better
understanding of the extent to which a given set of laws and policies shapes the
business environment so that they trigger a pro-competitive reaction on the part of
ﬁrms, the systematic collection of harmonised cross-country datasets (such as the
EFIGE dataset) is a pre-condition for these analyses. 
Last but not least, a growing concern among European citizens and politicians is that
society should have other objectives than the mere promotion of the ability to
exchange goods and services and, in general, higher growth rates. Sometimes those
other objectives (eg social cohesion) may create a temporary trade-oﬀ with
productivity growth and competitiveness-related policies. The opportunity cost of
those alternative objectives in terms of foregone productivity should nonetheless be
evaluated in order to assess the relevant trade-oﬀs in a transparent (and thus eﬃcient)
way. Hence, when societies pursue complex objectives, it is even more important for
policymakers to complement the standard aggregate measures of productivity with
more disaggregated measures that better capture the way people and ﬁrms actually
behave and how they react to economic incentives. 
In conclusion, this report shows that the promotion of ﬁrm productivity, so central to
fostering competitiveness at the country level, can and should go beyond the
traditional exercise of educated guesswork around a blackbox. Such an approach was
perfectly justiﬁable when ﬁrm-level data was not available. But now ﬁrm-level data is
available (and processable), the continuation of the traditional approach is a barrier to
policymakers accessing a more comprehensive toolkit when promoting competitive -
ness. One of the most important lessons learned during the crisis is that the
informational toolbox on which policymakers base their decisions is utterly outdated
in terms of both data sources and data analysis. In particular, the ability to eﬀectively
exploit the newly available wealth of information has been hampered by inertia in the
ongoing use of a restricted set of economic indicators, mostly designed when the
richness and detail of available data was much less than today. This toolbox is
particularly outdated when it comes to the analysis of micro data on the behaviour of
ﬁrms, an analysis to which this report hopes to contribute.
The rest of this volume is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the implications of
measuring competitiveness at ﬁrm level, and the diﬀerences with respect to the use
of aggregate statistics. Section 3 describes the EFIGE dataset and its construction.
Section 4 provides a validation of our data with respect to oﬃcial aggregate statistics
EFIGE CROSS-COUNTRY REPORT INTRODUCTION
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and assesses the correlation patterns between the entire range of international
activities of ﬁrms across EU countries and their productivity (measured as both LP and
TFP). It also discusses the correlation patterns between the range of international
activities of ﬁrms and their ULCs, debating the relevance of this variable as a proxy for
competitiveness. Section 5 crucially explores in detail the triggers of competitiveness,
that is the characteristics (in terms of innovation, access to ﬁnance, training of the
workforce, organisation, etc) of those ﬁrms that are able over time to move from
beneath to above the minimum productivity cut-oﬀ required to become competitive in
the international environment. Section 6 oﬀers a summary of the main results of the
paper and discusses their main policy implications for the EU.
EFIGE CROSS-COUNTRY REPORT INTRODUCTION
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2 From country to ﬁrm-level
measures of
competitiveness
When discussing competitiveness in policy circles, the tendency is to measure it using
aggregate country- or industry-level data, as these are easier to understand, calculate
and communicate. However, since it is neither countries nor industries that produce,
sell and export, but rather ﬁrms within countries and industries, in reality it is
diﬀerences between ﬁrms that ultimately make up aggregate statistics. In other words,
policy-relevant measures of competitiveness result from averages calculated from
diﬀerent ﬁrm performances in a given country or industry. The latter is potentially
problematic.
Contrary to common belief, in fact, there is no ‘average ﬁrm’. Rather, data shows that
within narrowly deﬁned (4-digit SIC) industries in any given country, the top 10 percent
of best performing ﬁrms is typically much more productive than the bottom 10 percent.
Taking an average sector in the US, for example, the best ﬁrms produce twice as much
output with the same amount of input (ie their total factor productivity is twice as great)
compared to the worst ﬁrms in the same sector (Syverson, 2004). In emerging
economies, these intra-industry diﬀerences in performance are even greater, with the
best ﬁrms producing to ﬁve times more than the worst ﬁrms, from the same inputs
(Hsieh and Klenow, 2009).
More generally, a substantial empirical literature has revealed that when analysing
ﬁrm-level performance, the shares of bad and good ﬁrms are not balanced in that, while
there are many bad ﬁrms, there are only a handful of very good ﬁrms, no matter which
speciﬁc measure of ﬁrm-level performance (employment, turnover, added value per
worker, total factor productivity, wage, etc) is chosen. Indeed, within a sector or a
country, ﬁrm performance is typically distributed as in Figure 1.
12
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Figure 1 compares the standard assumed distribution of ﬁrm performance (normal, in
blue) with the actual distribution (Pareto, in red), both yielding a similar average
performance. It shows that the former underestimates the share of bad ﬁrms, because
in reality bad ﬁrms are much more common than good ﬁrms (compare the red vs. blue
area to the right of the two distributions). The ﬁgure also shows the minimum per -
formance threshold required to compete internationally. Crucially, our data shows that
this threshold is in general well above the average performance of ﬁrms in any given
country or industry (speciﬁcally, from the seventh decile and above of the average
TFP distribution, see Section 5). These facts have two major consequences for the
policy relevance of aggregate measures of competitiveness.
The ﬁrst consequence stems from the evidence (conﬁrmed in our data) that intra-
industry diﬀerences between ﬁrms are much greater than the diﬀerence in average
ﬁrm performance measured across countries or industries. It then follows that the
typically-used aggregate measures of competitiveness, which are an average derived
from a very heterogeneous distribution, might have a limited informational content
and thus lead to relatively ineﬃcient policy prescriptions, a problem known as
aggregation bias.
EFIGE CROSS-COUNTRY REPORT MEASURES OF COMPETITIVENESS
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Figure 1: Actual (Pareto) vs. assumed (normal) distribution of firms’
performances
Source: Altomonte et al (2011).
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7. See Altomonte et al (2011) for a detailed analysis of this argument.
8. A detailed discussion of the role of reallocations in shaping competitiveness at ﬁrm and industry level is provided
in section 5. 
But even assuming that a correct measure of competitiveness can be retrieved and
properly aggregated, policies that aim to raise the average performance of the ﬁrms in
an industry or country – leaving unchanged the proportion of ‘best’ ﬁrms able to
compete internationally (ie those above the minimum performance threshold) could
be misguided. While successful in increasing the aggregate average performance,
these policies would have limited eﬀects on a country’s competitiveness, since too
few ﬁrms would actually perform above the required minimum threshold. In other
words, in a situation characterised by strong underlying ﬁrm heterogeneity,
competitiveness-enhancing policies should be assessed also against the variation in
dispersion of the performance measure they generate (the change in the right tail of
the distribution), not only the change in averages7. The latter, which can be referred to
as a dispersion bias, is a second, important problem associated with the use of
aggregate competitiveness measures without consideration of the underlying ﬁrm-
level heterogeneity. 
An example of both aggregation and dispersion bias in interpreting competitiveness
data is the so-called ‘Spanish paradox’. From 2000 to 2009, Spain displayed a constant
worsening of its price competitiveness (as measured in terms of both ULC and export
prices) in excess of 10-15 percent. Nevertheless, the Spanish share of world exports
ﬁrst increased (by some 10 percent in the mid 2000s) and then barely moved with
respect to its initial levels. Antrás et al (2010) have explored this ‘Spanish paradox’,
ﬁnding that when ﬁrm-level instead of aggregate-economy ULC developments are
considered, Spain’s experience is less paradoxical. They ﬁnd that the ULCs of the
largest ﬁrms in Spain have behaved best over the last decade and, in turn, the exports
of those ﬁrms increased faster than those of other domestic ﬁrms. The diﬀerent relative
weights of large, performing ﬁrms versus smaller, under-performing ﬁrms in aggregate
ULCs and in total exports may thus help to explain the ‘Spanish paradox’.
Policy-makers should therefore be cautious when assessing competitiveness at the
industry or country level on the basis of aggregate measures that do not take into
account ﬁrm characteristics, as the chosen measure of performance might be loosely
or spuriously related to the policy outcome (competitiveness) because of aggregation
or dispersion biases, and can consequently lead to bad quality policy-making.
What really matters for enhancing competitiveness is the ability to reallocate resources
so that ﬁrms move from below to above the relevant minimum performance cut-oﬀ8.
EFIGE CROSS-COUNTRY REPORT MEASURES OF COMPETITIVENESS
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In this respect, micro-level analysis can be very informative, because it reveals the
ﬁrm-speciﬁc channels of competitiveness otherwise hidden by industry- or country-
level aggregations. To undertake these analyses, however, appropriate ﬁrm-level
comparable datasets have to be used, something so far not available for EU countries.
The EFIGE project, introduced in the next section, aims to bridge this gap.
EFIGE CROSS-COUNTRY REPORT MEASURES OF COMPETITIVENESS
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9. The representativeness of the sample with respect to the actual population of ﬁrms is discussed in Barba Navaretti
et al (2011). The sampling design has been structured following a stratiﬁcation by industry and firm size, with an
oversampling of large ﬁrms. Throughout the analysis, we have applied a weighting in order to guarantee the
representativeness of our results.
10. Proprietary structure of the ﬁrm; Structure of the workforce; Investment, technological innovation and R&D;
Internationalisation; Finance; Market and pricing.
3 Why we need the EFIGE
dataset
The previous section has shown that aggregate industrial performance depends
heavily on ﬁrm-level factors (eg size, organisation, technological capacity), a ﬁnding
also supported by a vast theoretical and empirical literature starting from Melitz (2003)
and summarised by Behrens et al (2011). At the same time, the analysis of
competitiveness based on ﬁrm-level measures calls for new and better data that is
sometimes hard to obtain for several reasons. This is where the EFIGE dataset comes
into play. It provides representative and comparable samples of manufacturing ﬁrms
in seven European countries. It includes about 3,000 ﬁrms for each of Germany,
France, Italy and Spain, more than 2,200 ﬁrms for the United Kingdom, and about 500
ﬁrms for each of Austria and Hungary (precise ﬁgures are reported in Table 1). The
survey from which the dataset has been built excluded ﬁrms with fewer than 10
employees. As a result, internationally active ﬁrms should be over-represented in the
sample, compared with the actual distribution of ﬁrms in a country, which is typically
characterised by a large number of relatively small, domestic ﬁrms. Appendix 1 gives
the distribution of the sample by industry and size class for each country9.
Importantly, the EFIGE survey covers a broad array of questions that allow us to
address several crucial issues related to competitiveness. Overall, the questionnaire
contains both qualitative and quantitative data on ﬁrms’ characteristics and activities,
for a total of about 150 variables split into six sections10. Most questions relate to the
year 2008, with some questions requesting information for 2009 and previous years
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11. The questionnaire has been administered between January and April 2010 via either CATI (Computer Assisted
Telephone Interview) or CAWI (Computer Assisted Web Interview) procedures. The complete questionnaire is
available on the EFIGE web page, www.eﬁge.org. A discussion of the dataset as well as preliminary evidence on
the internationalisation modalities of ﬁrms is available in the 2nd EFIGE Policy Report by Barba Navaretti et al
(2011). The 3rd EFIGE Policy Report by Békés et al (2011) discusses explicitly the reaction of ﬁrms to the crisis.
in order to build a picture of the eﬀects of the crisis, and the dynamic evolution of ﬁrms’
activities11.
Table 1: EFIGE sample size, by country
Country Number of firms
Austria 443
France 2,973
Germany 2,935
Hungary 488
Italy 3,021
Spain 2,832
UK 2,067
Total 14,759
Source: EFIGE Survey dataset. Note: Industry codes are not available for 316 ﬁrms.
An interesting characteristic of the EFIGE dataset is that, on top of the unique and
comparable cross-country ﬁrm-level information contained in the survey, data can be
matched with balance sheet ﬁgures. More precisely, EFIGE data has been integrated
with balance-sheet data drawn from the Amadeus database managed by Bureau van
Dijck, retrieving nine years of usable balance-sheet information for each surveyed
ﬁrm, from 2001 to 2009. This data in particular enables the calculation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
measures of productivity and a number of ﬁnancial indicators, measured over time.
The ﬁrst use for the EFIGE dataset is to explore the correlation patterns between the
various international activities of ﬁrms (imports, exports, foreign direct investment,
international outsourcing) and ﬁrms’ competitiveness, as measured by various proxies
of productivity, across the countries surveyed. The information from the survey allows
us to classify ﬁrms into seven non-mutually exclusive internationalisation categories.
Firms are considered exporters if they reply ‘yes, directly from the home country’ to a
question asking if the ﬁrm sold abroad some or all of its own products/services in
200812. We follow the same procedure with imports, distinguishing between imports
of materials and services. With respect to foreign direct investment (FDI) and
international outsourcing (IO), we asked if ﬁrms were carrying out at least part of their
EFIGE CROSS-COUNTRY REPORT WHY WE NEED EFIGE
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12. In order to encompass the phenomenon of temporary traders (Bèkès and Murakozy, 2011), we have considered
as exporter also a ﬁrm replying ‘regularly/always’ or ‘sometimes’ to the question ‘Before 2008, has the ﬁrm exported
any of its products?’. For importing ﬁrms, we combine the following questions: ﬁrms replying ‘yes, from abroad’ to
‘In 2008 has the ﬁrm purchased any materials (services) for its domestic production?’ and ﬁrms replying
‘regularly/always’ or ‘sometimes’ to ‘Before 2008, did the ﬁrm purchase any materials (services) from abroad?’
13. Note that these ﬁrms are attributed to the country in which they are located and thus surveyed, although the
‘nationality’ of the group they possibly belong to may be diﬀerent.
production activity in another country. Firms replying ‘yes, through direct investment
(ie foreign aﬃliates/controlled ﬁrms) ’ are considered to be undertaking FDI, while
ﬁrms replying ‘yes, through contracts and arm’s length agreements with local ﬁrms’, are
considered to be pursuing an active international outsourcing strategy13. We then
looked at ﬁrms involved in international value chains, although not actively pursuing
an internationalisation strategy, with a question asking if part of the ﬁrm’s turnover
was made up of sales generated by a speciﬁc order coming from a customer
(produced-to-order goods). Firms replying positively, and indicating that their main
customers for the production-to-order activity are other ﬁrms located abroad, are
considered to be pursuing a passive outsourcing strategy. Hence, a passive outsourcer
is the counterpart of an active outsourcer in an arm’s length transaction. Finally, on
the basis of a question that allows the identiﬁcation of the main geographical areas of
the exporting activity, we have identiﬁed ‘global exporters’, ie ﬁrms that export to
countries outside the EU.
Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics for our seven categories of international
ﬁrms, and for the residual category of local ﬁrms not active abroad. Appendix 1
provides additional information on the various international activities of ﬁrms across
countries, including the average share of ﬁrms in each category (extensive margin),
and to what extent each international activity on average contributes to a ﬁrm’s total
turnover (intensive margin). Appendix 1 also summarises in detail the relevant
questions in the EFIGE survey associated with each international category used in this
report, as well as the other variables used in the analysis.
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14. As already stated, the fact that internationally active ﬁrms are more numerous in our sample than domestic ﬁrms
derives from the truncation of the sample at 10 employees. A general validation of ﬁrms’ characteristics as derived
from the sample compared to oﬃcial structural business statistics is provided in Section 4.1.
15. We do not control here for foreign ownership, that is, if a given ﬁrm is controlled by a foreign entity, while we account
for the fact that a given ﬁrm controls an aﬃliate abroad (foreign investment). 
Table 2: International categories of firms – descriptive statistics (full sample),
2008
No. of Avg. turnover per Avg. no. of Avg. capital stock per
firms firm (in €1,000s) employees  employee (in €1,000s)
Non-active abroad 3,402 4,443.33 31.44 152.16 
Active abroad 11,357 19,273.46 139.85 196.4 
of which 
Exporter 9,849 20,494.21 151.42 199.03  
Importer of services 3,449 38,659.98 332.12 223.57
Importer of materials 7,298 24,976.44 191.17 200.36
Global exporter 4,016 24,777.71 103.43 222.93
Passive outsourcer 5,799 17,052.42 83.96 204.98
Active outsourcer 590 24,657.11 119.55 225.28
FDI 719 77,637.20 334.13 239.55
Whole sample 14,759 15,589.29 114.52 186.59
Source: EFIGE dataset.
From Table 2, we can identify a clear ranking of ﬁrm characteristics with respect to the
degree of involvement in international activities, in line with an enriched theory of self-
selection of heterogeneous ﬁrms involved in international activities, as in Helpman et
al (2004). In particular, Table 2 shows that internationally active ﬁrms tend to be larger,
have higher sales and are more capital intensive14. The ﬁrm’s turnover ranking tends
to increase with the degree of complexity of international activities, from exporter, to
importer of material/active outsourcing, to importer of services and FDI. Local ﬁrms
involved in international value chains (ie the ‘passive outsourcers’) are somewhat
smaller than average internationally active ﬁrms, but are larger than purely local
ﬁrms15.
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16. Using ordinary least squares when estimating productivity implies treating labour and other inputs as exogenous
variables. However, proﬁt-maximising ﬁrms adjust their inputs each time they observe a productivity shock, which
means input levels are correlated with the same shocks. Since the latter are unobserved by the econometrician,
inputs turn out to be correlated with the error, biasing the OLS estimates of production functions. Olley and Pakes
(1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) have developed two similar semi-parametric estimation procedures to
overcome this problem, using investment and material costs, respectively, as proxies for these unobservable shocks.
4 Internationalisation and ﬁrm
competitiveness
We can now assess the correlation between the degree of involvement in international
activities and ﬁrm competitiveness. From a theoretical point of view, ﬁrm
competitiveness is best captured by the concept of total factor productivity (TFP). This
measures productive eﬃciency, that is how much output a ﬁrm can produce for any
given amount of input. In other words, a ﬁrm has higher TFP than a competitor if it is able
to produce more output with the same amount of input.
From the overlaid EFIGE and Amadeus data it is possible to calculate TFP for around 50
percent of the ﬁrms present in the dataset. To that end, we ﬁrst assign our observational
units to sectors (at NACE 2 digit levels) pooling ﬁrm-level data across countries and
years, and then we run for each sector the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) semi-parametric
production function estimation algorithm, controlling for country and year ﬁxed-eﬀects.
This allows us to overcome the simultaneity bias that aﬀects standard estimates of
ﬁrm-level productivity, and to derive TFP estimates from heterogeneous, industry-
speciﬁc production functions, as explained in detail in Appendix 2 16.
In terms of the variables included in the estimation of the production function, following
standard practice in the literature output is proxied by added value, deﬂated using
industry-speciﬁc (NACE rev 1.1) price indices retrieved from Eurostat (estimates using
revenues as a proxy are fully comparable). The labour input is measured by the number
of employees, while capital is proxied by the value of tangible ﬁxed assets deﬂated
using the GDP deﬂator. Material costs are instead deﬂated by average industry-speciﬁc
PPIs (Producers Price Index) weighted by input-output table coeﬃcients.
20
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4.1 Descriptive statistics and validation of measures
Table 3 reports the average TFP of ﬁrms pursuing diﬀerent international activities
alongside the other ﬁrm characteristics already shown in Table 2, with the sample now
limited to those ﬁrms for which it is possible to retrieve TFP. As can be seen, the
resulting restricted sample does not show any particular bias in terms of
representation by category of ﬁrm, nor in terms of overall ranking. 
Table 3: International categories of firms – descriptive statistics (restricted
sample), 2008
No. of firms Avg. Avg. no. of Avg. capital Total Unit labour Labour
turnover employees stock per Factor cost productivity
(in €1,000s) employee Productivity (in € per unit (added value
(in €1,000s) of added per employee
value) in €1,000s) 
Non active abroad 1,514 5,298.51 31.67 156.14 0.872 0.77 50.71 
Active abroad 5,921 24,623.51 152 200.01 1.024 0.78 57.55 
of which 
Exporter 5,201 26,104.12 164.41 203.19 1.033 0.77 58.09  
Importer of services 1,900 50,004.76 372.81 230.61 1.159 0.84 61.81
Importer of materials 3,939 31,647.82 208.25 203.31 1.058 0.79 58.43
Global exporter 2,211 28,345.27 104.42 224.77 1.094 0.79 62.56
Passive outsourcer 2,965 20,763.66 84.31 208.06 1.06 0.79 59.86
Active outsourcer 306 32,991.62 127.39 224.94 1.066 0.76 56.03
FDI 387 98,554.23 359.7 238.08 1.293 1.05 63.35
Whole sample 7,435 20,303.82 125.6 190.39 0.991 0.78 56.05
Source : EFIGE dataset. Note: Numbers are weighted sample averages. TFP is the Solow residual of the production
function.
Table 3 conveys a message that is very much in line with well-known results from the
literature: internationally active ﬁrms are bigger, have higher turnovers, have large
capital stocks and higher TFP.
Table 3 also reports two additional and commonly used measures of ﬁrm-level
competitiveness, namely labour productivity (added value per employee, LP) and unit
labour costs (total wage bill per unit of output, ULC). Importantly, ULC, at the ﬁrm level,
is the building block of aggregate measures of competitiveness, and as such it is
interesting to compare with our estimated TFP.
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To this extent, the relative correlations between the retrieved measures of TFP, LP and
ULC in our data are reported in Table 4. As can be seen, TFP and LP are positively and
signiﬁcantly correlated at 70 percent, in line with the ﬁndings of the literature. More
surprising, however, are the relatively small (albeit correctly signed and signiﬁcant)
correlation coeﬃcients between the two productivity measures and ULCs, which are
below 30 percent. Such a low correlation requires a more in depth analysis, especially
to the extent that aggregate measures of competitiveness are based on averages of
ﬁrm-level ULCs (see below).
Table 4: Correlations between measures of firm competitiveness
TFP   Labour productivity 
Labour productivity 0.695*** 
Unit labour cost  -0.277***  -0.267***   
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EFIGE and Amadeus datasets.
Note: ***denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 1 percent level. 
To assess the representativeness of our restricted sample (ie the one containing those
ﬁrms whose productivity was computable), in Table 5 we report the correlation
between the Amadeus variables we have used to compute productivity and ULC,
aggregated for each country-year, and the same variables from Eurostat Structural
Business Statistics (for manufacturing ﬁrms with more than 10 employees).
Correlations are overall high and signiﬁcant.
Table 5: Correlations between Amadeus and Eurostat variables
Number of employees 0.61***
Revenues/production value 0.52***
Cost of employees/wages 0.71***
Labour productivity 0.84***
Note: Observations are country-year-speciﬁc averages (weighted in Amadeus sample). Eurostat data is derived from
Structural Business Statistics, Manufacturing, more than 10 employees.
Note: ***denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 1 percent level. 
In Table 6, we also report the correlations between oﬃcial measures of ULC and those
computed from Amadeus data by aggregating individual ﬁrm-level measures of ULC
for each country-year. The correlation over the whole sample (0.48 and highly
signiﬁcant) is aﬀected by the heterogeneous quality of balance-sheet data in diﬀerent
countries. In fact, the breakdown by country yields a negative (-0.25) though not
signiﬁcant correlation for Austria, and positive but insigniﬁcant correlations for Hungary
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17. Correlations for the UK were not computable.
(0.56) and Germany (0.49). In contrast, France (0.93), Italy (0.91) and Spain (0.79)
display high and strongly signiﬁcant correlations between ﬁrm-level and aggregate
ULC measures.
Table 6: Unit Labour Cost, correlations between Amadeus and Eurostat variables,
by country17
Whole sample 0.48***
Austria -0.25
France 0.93***
Germany 0.49
Italy 0.91***
Spain 0.79**
United Kingdom —-
Hungary 0.56
Note: The correlation is computed between two indexes of ULC, which take value 100 in year 2005. Observations are
country-year-speciﬁc averages (weighted in Amadeus sample). UK ﬁgures are not available in Eurostat.
Similar results are obtained in Table 7 which looks at the cost of employees in diﬀerent
countries: correlations are high and strongly signiﬁcant for France (0.99), Germany
(0.8), Italy (0.96), Spain (0.99) and the UK (0.88). Austria (0.2) and Hungary (-0.56)
display insigniﬁcant correlations. The picture does not change much when looking at
LP: negative and not signiﬁcant for Austria (-0.88); high and strongly signiﬁcant for
France (0.99), Italy (0.85), Spain (0.97) and the UK (0.98); positive and not signiﬁcant
for Hungary (0.46).
Table 7: Correlations between Amadeus and Eurostat variables, by country
Cost of Labour
employees/ wages productivity
Austria 0.2 -0.88
France 0.99*** 0.99***
Germany 0.8* -0.78
Italy 0.96*** 0.85**
Spain 0.99*** 0.97***
United Kingdom 0.88** 0.98***
Hungary -0.56 0.46
Note: Observations are country-year-speciﬁc averages (weighted in Amadeus sample).
1852 Blueprint XVII pp i-x,1-68 - 18.7.12  18/7/12  11:47  Page 23
The descriptive statistics we have shown so far yield a clear message: with respect to
oﬃcial statistics, measures are largely comparable for the whole sample but might be
imprecise for some countries. For this reason, in what follows we will always control for
country ﬁxed eﬀects when presenting our econometric results.
Based on the descriptive evidence reported so far, we stick to TFP as our preferred
measure of ﬁrm-level competitiveness. Again, to test aggregation properties in terms
of country representativeness, we exploit the ﬁrm-speciﬁc information in order to
obtain a country-speciﬁc TFP index. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst compute year/country/sector-
speciﬁc weighted averages of ﬁrm-level productivity measures. Then we create an
index setting the year-2001 TFP level equal to 100 for each country and sector. Finally,
we retrieve the country/year-speciﬁc aggregate TFP as the mean across sectors of
these indexed TFP measures. Figure 2 shows the results.
Figure 2: Aggregate TFP dynamics, by country, 2001-09
Source: Bruegel based on EFIGE and Amadeus datasets.
The dynamics of TFP aggregated from ﬁrm-level information are comparable to well-
known results on aggregate country competitiveness, with Hungary, a transition
economy under convergence, displaying the highest productivity gains in the early
2000s, followed by Germany, France and Austria. The stagnating productivity trends
of Spain and Italy are also evident. Somehow surprising at ﬁrst glance is the dismal
performance of the UK, but this might be explained by the fact that we are looking at
the manufacturing sector of an economy with a growing competitive advantage in
services. Finally, all countries display a marked decrease in their productivity trend in
2009.
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18. For the other countries in the sample, the availability of TFP-related variables at the ﬁrm-level varies across the
years, thus preventing us from properly evaluate the robustness of our TFP measures vs. oﬃcial statistics across
the entire time span.
Productivity dynamics obtained from Amadeus can also be formally validated against
oﬃcial ﬁgures, always exploiting the link between our representative sample and
balance-sheet data. In particular, for those countries for which we have relatively
complete time series at the ﬁrm-level (France, Italy and Spain) over the entire period,
it is possible to directly match the productivity dynamics of the Amadeus sample ﬁrms
with similar aggregate statistics, in this case retrieved from the OECD’s STAN dataset18.
This match is reported in Table 8.
Table 8 – Labour productivity growth, Comparison between EFIGE (merged with
Amadeus) and OECD- STAN
Country Year STAN Amadeus- STAN Amadeus- Amadeus-
(not deflated) EFIGE (not manufacturing EFIGE, EFIGE
deflated) (deflated) (deflator) manufacturing (2-digit 
(deflator)
France Δ(2008-2001) 9.80 10.24 12.63 12.62 14.14 
Spain Δ(2008-2001) 9.57 9.66 1.55 1.13 -0.11 
Italy Δ(2008-2001) 6.38 7.95 -2.00 -0.51 -1.51 
Source: Barba Navaretti et al (2012). Note: France and Spain do not have information on employees for 2008 in the
OECD-STAN database: the aggregate values refer to 2007.
Based on these results and on the robustness of our productivity measures, a standard
method of showing selection into diﬀerent internationalisation activities is to draw the
kernel density estimates of the productivity distribution for ﬁrms involved in each of
these activities, and compare it with those of ﬁrms that are internationally inactive. A
kernel density shows the shares of ﬁrms (‘density’) that attain each productivity level,
that is, the probability of picking a ﬁrm with a certain productivity level when the ﬁrm
is randomly drawn from each category of activities. The comparisons are shown in
Figure 3. It should be kept in mind that internationalisation categories are not mutually
exclusive because ﬁrms can be engaged in more than one international activity at a
time (see Table 2 for details), while the category of ﬁrms that are non-active abroad is
constant for Figure 3 panels (a) and (b).
Both panels of Figure 3 send the same message: a randomly drawn ﬁrm that is active
internationally is likely to be more productive than a randomly drawn ﬁrm that is
inactive internationally. 
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The fact that productivity densities vary across internationalisation categories
suggests that the costs associated with international operations might vary across
the diﬀerent activities. To deepen the investigation of this issue, we analyse next how
the probability that a ﬁrm is active in each international activity is associated with the
observed level of productivity. In particular, Figure 4 shows the ‘extensive margin’
(share of active ﬁrms over total number of ﬁrms) of each internationalisation activity
by decile of productivity.
The ﬁrst thing to notice in Figure 4 is the overall upward slope of the histograms when
moving from left to right, that is from low to high productivity deciles. In line with the
literature, the higher the productivity deciles, the more likely it is for ﬁrms to be
involved in some international activity. In other words, more productive ﬁrms self-
select into internationalisation status. However, the richness of information in our
dataset allows us to go further than that, distinguishing the various internationalisation
activities in terms of selectivity.
To see this, let us focus on the most productive 10 percent of all ﬁrms. The top right
graph in panel (a) of Figure 4 shows that among the ﬁrms in that decile, slightly more
than 90 percent are internationally active one way or another. Nonetheless, the
categories of internationalisation activity vary greatly: slightly less than 85 percent of
ﬁrms are exporters; two thirds are importers of materials; almost 50 percent are
importers of services or passive outsourcers; just below 45 percent are global exporters;
less than 15 percent are involved in FDI; and just above 5 percent are active outsourcers.
These ﬁndings reveal a clear ranking of internationalisation activities from low
selectivity (exporting) to high selectivity (FDI / active outsourcing) that hint at a
growing degree of complexity when moving from exporting to FDI and active
outsourcing. Thus, more competitive ﬁrms have access to a greater range of more
complex options when it comes to designing their international operations. Greater
competitiveness, as proxied by higher productivity, thus implies having the possibility
to exploit a richer toolbox to deal with the challenges and seize the opportunities of
globalisation. 
4.2 Econometric evidence
These relationships between ﬁrm competitiveness and internationalisation activities
can be further investigated by a cross-sectional econometric estimation, in which we
regress the TFP of each ﬁrm, as measured in 2008 against the diﬀerent categories of
internationalisation activities, adding country and sector ﬁxed eﬀects. In this way we
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Figure 3: TFP and internationalisation
(a) All internationalisers and traders 
(b) Oﬀshorers and outsourcers
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Figure 4: TFP and internationalisation
(a) All internationalisers and traders
(b) Oﬀshorers and outsourcers
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can conﬁrm our ﬁndings by excluding possible compositional eﬀects (ie particular
sectors or countries) from driving the descriptive statistics previously discussed.
OLS results are reported in Column (1) of Table 9. As expected, all coeﬃcients are
positive and signiﬁcant, while the ‘productivity premium’ increases with the complexity
of internationalisation activities. FDI and the import of services are associated with
the highest TFP premia, followed by outsourcing activities and ﬁnally simple import
and export strategies. Not surprisingly, however, ‘complex’ export strategies, as proxied
by the ability of ﬁrms to export beyond the EU, are associated with higher premia,
comparable to those derived from outsourcing. Indeed, this ranking is already visible
in Figure 3, where the more complex internalisation categories exhibit thicker density
at higher TFP levels. 
Table 9: International status and TFP premium
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. variable: TFP OLS OLS O.Probit N
Active abroad 0.0906*** 0.0353*** 0.261*** 7,259
(0.0132) (0.0128) (0.0290)
Exporter 0.0999*** 0.0399*** 0.272*** 6,563
(0.0136) (0.0131) (0.0298)
Importer of services 0.171*** 0.0626*** 0.620*** 3,334
(0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0531)
Importer of materials 0.118*** 0.0449*** 0.394*** 5,320
(0.0142) (0.0138) (0.0332)
FDI 0.257*** 0.0980*** 0.750*** 1,862
(0.0329) (0.0357) (0.0750)
Passive outsourcer 0.122*** 0.0558*** 0.329*** 4,372
(0.0151) (0.0150) (0.0342)
Active outsourcer 0.134*** 0.0477 0.364*** 1,777
(0.0309) (0.0306) (0.0755)
Global exporter 0.156*** 0.0699*** 0.425*** 3,652
(0.0168) (0.0167) (0.0368)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes –
Sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes –
Firm size No Yes No –
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 1 percent level. One cross-sectional
regression for each internationalisation characteristic, with sector and country dummies. Column 2 controls also for the
size class of ﬁrms (10-19; 20-49; 50-249; >=250 employees). The number of observations is given by the number of
inactive ﬁrms plus the number of ﬁrms active in the selected international activity. All regressions control for country
and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. Coeﬃcients of the ﬁrm size eﬀects included in column (2) are reported in Table 6.
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In column (2) of Table 9, in addition to country and sector ﬁxed eﬀects, we also control
for ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics, in particular the size classes of ﬁrms measured in
terms of number of employees. While the TFP premia associated with the various
internationalisation activities are signiﬁcantly reduced, their ranking is conﬁrmed. The
role of ﬁrm size is further investigated in Table 10, which reports the magnitude of the
ﬁxed eﬀects associated with each size class for the diﬀerent internationalisation
statuses in the regression of Table 9, column (2). As can be seen, coeﬃcients tend to
grow larger with ﬁrm size because more productive ﬁrms manage to grow larger than
their less productive counterparts. However, for a given size class of ﬁrm, the size
premium tends to be smaller in more complex international activities such as FDI or
outsourcing. This is further evidence of tougher selectivity at the top, as more complex
activities are chosen by ﬁrms which have TFPs above already quite high thresholds. In
other words, size matters more for relatively less-complex international activities.
Table 10: Firm size effects on TFP across internationalisation activities 
Dependent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
variable: TFP Active Exporter Imp. of Imp. of FDI Pass out. Act out. Global exp.
abroad service mat.
Small firms 
(20-49 employees) 0.162*** 0.156*** 0.168*** 0.160*** 0.144*** 0.154*** 0.137*** 0.180***
(0.0118) (0.0124) (0.0179) (0.0140) (0.0228) (0.0150) (0.0209) (0.0170)
Medium-sized firms 
(50-249 employees) 0.343*** 0.346*** 0.376*** 0.336*** 0.253*** 0.309*** 0.341*** 0.332***
(0.0157) (0.0165) (0.0240) (0.0182) (0.0363) (0.0199) (0.0344) (0.0227)
Large firms (over 
250 employees) 0.639*** 0.635*** 0.647*** 0.634*** 0.572*** 0.553*** 0.576*** 0.644***
(0.0271) (0.02-83) (0.0365) (0.0302) (0.0562) (0.0352) (0.0671) (0.0374)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 1 percent level. The coeﬃcients of
the internationalisation variables are reported in column (2) of Table 5 and are not repeated here.
We have also checked for the robustness of the OLS results by estimating an ordered
probit model, in which the internationalisation status is regressed across the decile
categories (from the ﬁrst to the tenth) of TFP analysed in Figure 3. The results are
reported in column (3) of Table 9. The interpretation of the coeﬃcient is slightly
diﬀerent here, but the results are quite consistent: the higher the productivity deciles,
the more likely that a ﬁrm will be involved in some internationalisation activity. This is
true for all activities though the eﬀect is strongest for FDI, followed by importers of
services, and is weakest for exporters that are only active within Europe.
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Summing up these preliminary results, we thus ﬁnd that productivity rankings are
broadly consistent with previous results in the literature that consider individual
countries and speciﬁc internationalisation activities. Importantly, the EFIGE dataset
gives more scope for analysis compared to the existing literature by providing
comparable information on the internationalisation choices of ﬁrms across a wide
range of international activities and across countries, within a homogenous analytical
framework. Productivity premia are thus fully comparable. In particular the analysis
conﬁrms two well-known self-selection eﬀects: 1) the productivity threshold above
which ﬁrms tend to be active internationally is highest for FDI (Helpman et al, 2004);
2) self-selection is strong and present also for importing activities (see, eg, Altomonte
and Békés, 2010, and Bernard et al, 2011). The analysis also reveals two (previously
unnoticed) additional features in the internationalisation-competitiveness relation -
ship: 3) participating in global value chains (both active and passive outsourcing in
our deﬁnition) is associated with higher productivity-premia; 4) ﬁrms that import
services exhibit a high TFP premium, possibly due to the complementarity between
complex internationalisation strategies and sophisticated services exported by
selected providers.
The cross-country comparability of the EFIGE dataset also allows us to investigate if
ﬁrms from diﬀerent countries, though involved in the same international activities,
exhibit diﬀerent productivity behaviours. To do that, we ran the same OLS speciﬁcation
as that reported in Table 9, adding an interaction term (on top of country ﬁxed eﬀects)
between a given country and the international status of the ﬁrms. We consider here
Italy, Germany and France.
The coeﬃcients of the interaction terms for the three countries are reported in the ﬁrst
three columns of Table 11. The average patterns are conﬁrmed in the cases of Italy
and Germany as most coeﬃcients are not statistically signiﬁcant. The only exception
concerns importers of materials, whose productivity diﬀerence with respect to
internationally inactive (domestic) ﬁrms is greater in Italy and France than in other
countries. France seems to be diﬀerent when looking at other international activities:
the productivity diﬀerence between its internationally active and inactive ﬁrms is larger
than in other countries. This feature holds for traders for all the categories (exporters,
importers of materials or services, global exporters).
1852 Blueprint XVII pp i-x,1-68 - 18.7.12  18/7/12  11:47  Page 31
19. Following Bugamelli et al (2010) we consider as being aﬀected from low-wage competition those industries in
which the world market share of Chinese exports is above the median world market share of Chinese exports.
Table 11: Productivity and internationalisation: country and industry effects 
Dep. var.: TFP ITA FRA GER Low wage sector
Active abroad 0.0209 0.0818** 0.0681 -0.00581
(0.0290) (0.0410) (0.0591) (0.0264)
Exporter 0.0128 0.0971** 0.0450 -0.00688
(0.0295) (0.0422) (0.0596) (0.0270)
Importer of services 0.0405 0.101** 0.0371 -0.0612*
(0.0374) (0.0499) (0.0669) (0.0336)
Importer of materials 0.0642** 0.0928** 0.0877 -0.0178
(0.0306) (0.0419) (0.0613) (0.0281)
FDI -0.0281 0.0918 -0.113 -0.227***
(0.0808) (0.0987) (0.0934) (0.0600)
Passive outsourcer -0.00690 0.0698 0.0373 0.00487
(0.0334) (0.0450) (0.0628) (0.0295)
Active outsourcer 0.0620 0.151 -0.00996 0.0616
(0.0784) (0.0929) (0.111) (0.0608)
Global exporter 0.0406 0.169*** 0.0738 -0.0233
(0.0364) (0.0513) (0.0668) (0.0330)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
The table reports the coeﬃcients of interaction terms between internationalisation status and country dummy (or
low-wage sector dummy). The results are obtained by including these interaction terms into the OLS model of Table
5, column 1.
Going from a country to an industry perspective, we have combined the
internationalisation status of ﬁrms with an sector-speciﬁc dummy taking a value of 1
if the industry is characterised by competition from low-wage countries (fourth column
of Table 11)19. Negative coeﬃcients show that the productivity diﬀerence with respect
to internationally inactive ﬁrms of the same country and sector (as shown in Table 9,
column 1) is smaller for internationally active ﬁrms in low-wage industries; even more
when they undertake FDI or import services. This is striking because we have seen
that in general these two activities are the most selective, and are associated with the
highest productivity premia. The negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients might indicate
that European ﬁrms use those complementary activities to face tough competition
from low-wage countries. The diﬀerence is indeed not present for other inter -
nationalisation categories, where ﬁrms operating in low-wage industries do not display
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a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent TFP premium for international activity compared to ﬁrms from
other industries.
As a further check, we regress two other competitiveness measures (LP and ULC)
against the international activities we have analysed so far. Table 12 reports the results
of the latter speciﬁcations together with those we have obtained using TFP as
performance indicator. 
Table 12: International status and alternative competitiveness measures
TFP Labour productivity Unit labour cost
Variables OLS N OLS N OLS N
Active abroad 0.0906*** 7,259 0.135*** 7,260 -0.0570*** 9,230
(0.0132) (0.0145) (0.00960)
Exporter 0.0999*** 6,563 0.141*** 6,564 -0.0545*** 8,281
(0.0136) (0.0149) (0.00991)
Importer of services 0.171*** 3,334 0.202*** 3,334 -0.0682*** 4,246
(0.0171) (0.0188) (0.0121)
Importer of materials 0.118*** 5,320 0.162*** 5,321 -0.0703*** 6,800
(0.0142) (0.0155) (0.0101)
FDI 0.257*** 1,862 0.226*** 1,862 -0.0927*** 2,392
(0.0329) (0.0373) (0.0253)
Passive outsourcer 0.122*** 4,372 0.158*** 4,372 -0.0630*** 5,672
(0.0151) (0.0169) (0.0111)
Active outsourcer 0.134*** 1,777 0.182*** 1,777 -0.0666*** 2,330
(0.0309) (0.0359) (0.0212)
Global exporter 0.156*** 3,652 0.198*** 3,652 -0.0631*** 4,588
(0.0168) (0.0184) (0.0122)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 1 percent level. One cross-sectional
regression for each internationalisation characteristic, with sector and country dummies. The number of observations
is given by the number of inactive ﬁrms plus the number of ﬁrms active in the selected international activity.
Table 12 shows that TFP and LP premia are fully comparable across international
statuses. This is the case both in terms of magnitude (with premia ranging between 10
and 25 percent relative to internationally inactive ﬁrms) and in terms of ranking (with
FDI always being associated with the most productive category of ﬁrms, followed by
importers of services, outsourcers, importers of materials and simple exporters). These
ﬁndings are not surprising in light of the relatively high correlation between the two
measures of productivity (Table 4).
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Not unexpectedly, given the low correlation with TFP, ULCs convey a slightly diﬀerent
message. Internationalisation premia are still there and signiﬁcant, showing that
internationally active ﬁrms have lower ULCs compared to local ﬁrms. However,
magnitudes are smaller as premia range between 5 and 9 percent vis-à-vis
internationally inactive ﬁrms. The ranking also changes. While ﬁrms undertaking FDI
are still the most competitive, ﬁrms importing material goods are closing in on them.
Hence, although ULCs seem to capture elements of competitiveness diﬀerent from
productivity, the fact that all coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly negative sends a message
of overall consistency across measures of competitiveness. To this extent, Appendix
5 explores the potential divergence between ULC and TFP in greater detail, relating ULC
to the quality of labour force at the ﬁrm level. Preliminary evidence suggests that using
ULC-based measures of competitiveness might be inappropriate when an increase in
the cost of employees aﬀects R&D-intensive ﬁrms. In particular, the eﬀect of ULC on
the probability of exporting is less signiﬁcant for those ﬁrms involved in R&D activities.
Or, in other words, once we control for quality (as proxied by R&D), the signiﬁcance of
ULC as a predictor of the probability of being an exporter is restored. When using TFP
as a proxy of competitiveness, R&D activities at the ﬁrm level do not seem to aﬀect
the ability of TFP to predict the export status of a ﬁrm.
In short, for ﬁrms with R&D activities, an increase in their unit labour costs does not
necessarily aﬀect their ability to export (their competitiveness does not depend
exclusively on the competitive price of the goods sold), whereas for those ﬁrms that
do not undertake R&D activities, an increase in ULC translates more strongly into a
reduction of the probability of exporting, conﬁrming the idea that quality matters. These
distortions are not present when using TFP as a proxy for competitiveness.
Because in aggregate we are typically unable to distinguish R&D activities when
deriving average ULCs across ﬁrms, we therefore conclude that while ULC measures
can be appropriately informative for broad macro-policy assessments of a country’s
competitiveness, an analysis of ﬁrm-level TFP dynamics is what one should look at
for more in-depth analyses, and resulting policies to enhance competitiveness.
The diﬃculty of using price/cost indicators when assessing competitiveness is also
reﬂected by other studies. It has been shown that looking at ULC, in the case of Spain,
is a way to get trapped in the so-called 'Spanish competitiveness paradox'. That is,
even though Spanish ULC during the decade starting in 2000 grew more quickly than
in the main developed economies, Spanish export shares did not fall by as much as
those of the same countries, with the sole exception of Germany (Rodríguez Crespo et
al, 2012). Again, this suggests that ULC measures not only competitiveness.
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20. For a detailed discussion of this point see Altomonte et al (2011).
5 What triggers
competitiveness?
The ﬁndings outlined so far suggest that, within industries and countries, ﬁrms self-
select into international activities, with only the most productive ﬁrms able to compete
internationally. In other words, there exists a minimum performance threshold of
productivity above which ﬁrms can be considered competitive in international
markets20. We have also learned that such a threshold is quite stable across countries,
but varies between international activities, with more complex (costly) activities
(outsourcing and FDI) reserved for the top group of the most productive ﬁrms. In light
of this evidence, it is interesting to identify more precisely the minimum threshold of
performance above which the presence of a ﬁrm on international markets is triggered,
and, most interestingly, the ﬁrms’ characteristics (endowments, strategy, organisa -
tion) typically associated with the reaching such a performance threshold.
Taking TFP as our preferred proxy of ﬁrm performance, we develop a three-step
procedure to explore what triggers competitiveness. First, we identify the cut-oﬀ above
which ﬁrms are able to maintain an international presence. In particular, we deﬁne such
a threshold as the percentile in the TFP distribution (eg top 20 percent, top 30 percent
or so) that ﬁrms in our sample have to achieve to have at least a 95 percent probability
of being active abroad. Once the cut-oﬀ has been identiﬁed, we then proceed to isolate
those ﬁrms that between 2002-07 and 2008-09 switched from below to above the
threshold. Those ﬁrms able to reallocate their productivity above the identiﬁed level are
called switchers. We ﬁnally combine balance-sheet and EFIGE data in order to identify
the ﬁrm characteristics that have an impact on the probability of switching.
5.1 Minimum performance cut-oﬀ and switchers
To identify what level of productivity triggers internationalisation activity, we ran a
simple probit model regressing the international status of each ﬁrm (whether active
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21. To avoid dealing with missing data and attrition bias, we have considered average TFP in the 2001-07 vs. 2008-09
periods.
internationally or not) against a system of dummies positioning each ﬁrm in its 2008
deciles of TFP, controlling for country and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. We then tested the
joint hypothesis that any given combination of these dummies (ie deciles of
productivity) was signiﬁcantly associated to at least a 95 percent probability of being
active abroad. Results, reported in column 1 of Table 13, shows that all ﬁrms that are
at least in the seventh deciles in the TFP distribution have a signiﬁcant probability of
being active abroad. 
Table 13: Critical cut-off of TFP
Ho: Pct_7=0, Pct_8=0, Pct_9=0, Pct_10=0
Active abroad Exporter
(1) (2) (1) (2)
chi2(4) 75.39 22.97 57.37 11.38
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0226
Note: joint probability that a decile of TFP above or equal to the 7th is signiﬁcantly associated with a given
international status, controlling for industry, country (1) and ﬁrm-size (2) ﬁxed eﬀects.
The latter ﬁnding holds if a speciﬁc control for ﬁrm-size is added (column 2) or if the
exercise is repeated with the export status vs. the generic active abroad status
(columns 3 and 4).
Once the relevant cut-oﬀ has been identiﬁed, we then classiﬁed ﬁrms according to
their positioning in the TFP distribution before and after 200821. This allows us to sort
ﬁrms into four categories: those that remain always below the critical cut-oﬀ for the
entire time span of our sample (2001 to 2008); those ‘superstar’ ﬁrms that remain
always above it; those ﬁrms losing out in competitiveness and moving from above to
below the cut-oﬀ; and ﬁnally those ‘switching’ ﬁrms able to climb the competitiveness
ladder and pass the cut-oﬀ in 2008.
Table 14 provides the usual descriptive statistics for the four categories of ﬁrms. We
see how ﬁrms that remain or drop below the seventh deciles of TFP have lower average
turnover, tend to be smaller, have smaller capital stock, lower LP and higher ULC with
respect to the average ﬁrm in the whole sample. We also see that the 942 ﬁrms that
moved above the critical cut-oﬀ tend to be relatively small (34 employees vs. a sample
average of 126) but relatively well capitalised (above average). This indicates that
36
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22. In other words, we do not simply consider ﬁrms experiencing a positive growth of productivity between 2001-05
and 2006-09, but rather the top 25 percent of ﬁrms experiencing positive productivity growth.
other factors than size and turnover help trigger the ability of ﬁrms to rise above the
minimum performance cut-oﬀ for international activity. We will explore these additional
ﬁrm characteristics in the next section, after a robustness check of our deﬁnition of
switchers.
The four categories of ﬁrms have been sorted with respect to a well-deﬁned
performance threshold (the seventh decile of TFP distribution in 2008). However, this
deﬁnition might rule out some ﬁrms whose productivity has increased steadily over
the time span considered, but whose ﬁnal level of productivity in 2008 was not high
enough to qualify them as a switcher. This is because the productivity cut-oﬀ could
move over time, since it depends on the distribution of TFP observed in a given period.
Table 14: Characteristics of firms with respect to their TFP dynamics
Change in TFP No. Avg. Avg. no. Avg. Total Unit labour Labour
w.r. to of turnover of Capital Factor cost (in € productivity
the cut-off firms per firm employee stock per Productivity per unit of (value 
(7th TFP (in employee value added per 
decile) €1,000s) (in €1,000s) added) employee) 
Remain below 3823 146.1 27 157.9 0.653 0.845 39.346 
Move below 1010 12271.1 66.5 188.5 0.821 0.886 48.652
Move above 
(switcher) 942 7805.9 34 202.4 1.129 0.65 68.755
Remain above 2856 53921.1 341.9 248.8 1.546 0.649 79.394
Total 8631 19462.2 126.3 193.1 0.989 0.772 55.441
For these reasons, we have introduced a measure of ‘absolute’ productivity growth, by
computing the diﬀerence in the ﬁrm-speciﬁc average TFP between the periods 2006-
09 vs. 2001-05, thus creating a dummy variable that takes a value of one for those
ﬁrms whose diﬀerence lays in the last quartile of the resulting distribution22.
Table 15 shows that 1,811 ﬁrms, out of the 8,631 analysed, display a signiﬁcant
absolute growth in productivity (as deﬁned above). However, these ﬁrms are not
necessarily only those switchers able to overcome the performance cut-oﬀ. We ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant upward growth in productivity taking place also in lower TFP deciles (555
ﬁrms record such a performance even though they stay below the critical performance
threshold), while only some 57 percent of switching ﬁrms record a signiﬁcant absolute
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23. See, for instance, Brealey and Myers (2002).
increase in productivity (for those ﬁrms already in the ﬁfth or sixth TFP deciles it is
enough to register a moderate increase in TFP to overcome the critical performance
cut-oﬀ).
Table 15: Absolute TFP growth vs. TFP cut-off 
TFP growth Total
Firms’ performance vs. cut-off 0 1
Remain below 3,268 555 3,823
Move below 981 29 1,010
Move above (switcher) 405 537 942
Remain above 2,166 690 2,856
Total 6,820 1,811 8,631
We will use this information as a robustness check when analysing the relationship
between such performance in TFP (ability to overcome the cut-oﬀ or signiﬁcant
absolute productivity growth) and a number of structural ﬁrm characteristics (ﬁnancial,
organisational, etc), to which we now turn.
5.2 Financial characteristics of ﬁrms
To assess the impact of ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial characteristics on their performance, we
construct six ﬁnancial indicators retrieved from Amadeus balance-sheet data and
related to traditional ﬁnancial ratios, together with two additional indicators retrieved
directly from the EFIGE survey, aimed at measuring the extent to which ﬁrms are credit
constrained.
The Financial Independence Index (FII) indicator is a proxy for the long-term ﬁnancial
stability of a ﬁrm:
Capital + Cash Flows
FII = —————————
Total Assets
It evaluates the extent to which a ﬁrm is self-ﬁnancing its economic activity. The
optimal ratio is ﬁxed at greater than or equal to 0.33, meaning that at least one third of
the ﬁrm’s assets must be ﬁnanced (covered) by internal resources23.
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24. See Schiantarelli (1996), Blundell et al (1996), Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Hubbard (1998) and Claessens and
Tzioumis (2006) on the importance of sensitivity of investments to cash ﬂow in characterising ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial
soundness.
25. See Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) for a complete description of the index.
26. See Forlani (2010) for a detailed discussion.
The second indicator is a traditional cash ratio (CashR), measuring the ﬁrm’s chances
of paying oﬀ short-term debts without the need for additional external funds:
Cash Flows
CashR = ————————
Current Liabilities
If the index is greater than 1, a ﬁrm possesses suﬃcient resources to face the daily
cost of production24.
Third, the IFP (Index of Financial Pressure) index is the ratio between interest payments
and the sum of proﬁt before tax, depreciation and interest payments:
Interest Payments
IFP = ————————————————————————
Profits Before Taxes + Depreciation + Interest Payments
It is bounded between 0 and 1, with a higher value indicating greater ﬁnancial
pressure25.
A fourth index is the current ratio (CurrR), or working capital of a company, which relates
current liquidity to current liabilities as:
Current Assets
CurrR = ————————
Current Liabilities
The index signals a ﬁrm’s ability to cope with short-term liabilities (current liabilities,
and debts to be paid within 12 months) through activities to be carried out in the short
term (current assets that are available, such as cash and securities that can be
immediately cashed in). Traditionally, a CurrR greater than (or equal to) 1 usually leads
to a positive assessment of the company’s liquidity26.
The liquidity ratio (LR) and the leverage ratio (LevR) both take a more structural view
of a company’s ﬁnancial position. The former is computed as follows:
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27. Some examples of papers that use LR and LevR to assess the liquidity and the dependence on external ﬁnancial
means of a company are Whited (1992), Fazzari and Peterson (1993), Greenaway, Guariglia and Kneller (2007).
28. See Minetti and Zhu (2011) for a use of similar variables in their analysis of Italian exporters. 
Current Assets – Current Liabilities
LR = ———————————————
Total Assets
The numerator expresses the shape the company is in, in monetary terms. If it is
positive, the company is considered able to cope with short-term liabilities using its
current assets. That is, it is able to repay imminent debts with cash. A negative LR
indicates that the ﬁrm has diﬃculty meeting short-term liabilities. Clearly, the ability
(or inability) is more or less serious depending on the extent of the eventual imbalance
with respect to the total assets of the company (the denominator). A large negative LR
thus expresses not only a liquidity problem, but more in general the potential
insolvency of the company. Finally, the leverage ratio (LevR) indicates how much a
company depends on external ﬁnancial sources:
Total Debt
LevR = —————
Capital
The index compares the ﬁnancial resources available to the company in the form of
debt and those available as internal equity. It can take any positive value27.
Table 16 reports the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial scores measured in our sample for 2008, along
with some of the usual descriptive statistics. No speciﬁc pattern emerges, but it is clear
that the number of ﬁrms for which we have ﬁnancial information results from a
selection of our original sample, and is relatively biased towards large ﬁrms (average
ﬁrm size of those ﬁrms for which we can measure ﬁnancial indexes ranges from 125
to 137 employees). This, of course, induces a potential selection bias in the data which
could distort our analysis. We will deal with this problem when discussing our results.
Finally, from the EFIGE dataset, we compute two additional dummies relative to the
degree to which ﬁrms are credit constrained. The variable credit_req equals 1 if the ﬁrm
has asked for credit, while the variable credit_ob takes values of 1 if the ﬁrm has been
granted credit28. 
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29. These variables stem from the notion that family management, rather than family ownership, matters more in
aﬀecting the performance of a given ﬁrm vs. a corporation (Michelacci and Schivardi, 2011; Bugamelli et al, 2011).
In any case, as we can measure these dummies only for those ﬁrms that are family-owned (the control group
refers to non-family-owned ﬁrms plus those family-owned ﬁrms with below average family inﬂuence in
management), our dummies are also implicitly correlated to family ownership.
Table 16: Financial indexes and firm descriptive statistics
Variable No. of Avg. Avg. no. Avg. TFP Unit Labour % of % of 
firms turnover of capital labour productivity active exporter
per firm employeesstock per cost (in € (added abroad
(in employee per unit value
€1,000s) (in of added per
€1,000s) value) employee) 
FII 8,422 18,881.48 135.07 192.53 0.98 0.74 55.69 78% 69% 
CashR 8,425 17,884.95 130.96 194.81 0.95 0.73 55.26 78% 68%
IFP 7,934 18,120.02 137.50 188.04 1.00 0.73 56.56 78% 69%
CurrR 10,653 17,351.76 126.37 188.27 0.97 0.77 54.88 77% 67%
LR 11,246 16,977.78 124.89 188.11 0.97 0.76 55.18 76% 67%
LevR 11,487 16,998.94 125.66 192.43 1.00 0.75 56.54 76% 67%
Whole 
sample 14,759 15,589.29 114.52 186.59 0.99 0.77 55.02 74% 65%
5.3 Structural characteristics of ﬁrms
The literature has emphasised the role of managerial structure and practices in shaping
ﬁrm competitiveness, information that is unobservable from balance-sheet data but 
is available via EFIGE. In particular, to take into account the role of families in 
the management of companies, we have constructed two dummies: the ﬁrst
(fam_managed) takes value 1 if the share of executives (including middle manage -
ment) who are related to the family that owns the company is higher than the national
average of the family-owned ﬁrms in the sample; the second (fam_ceo) equals 1 if the
CEO of the ﬁrm is a member of the family that owns the company29.
We also control for some general characteristics of the managerial style of the ﬁrm,
via a dummy (decentr_manag) equal to 1 if the ﬁrm reports adopting a mostly
decentralised decision-making structure. Finally, we have generated a binary variable
equal to 1 if the ﬁrm’s employees have salaries partially linked to their performances
(ie productivity-based bonus).
1852 Blueprint XVII pp i-x,1-68 - 18.7.12  18/7/12  11:47  Page 41
The EFIGE survey also provides data on ﬁrms’ innovation strategies. We exploit that
information to compute a variable proxying the endowment of human capital, taking
value 1 if the share of graduate workers employed by the ﬁrm is greater than the
average of those employed by other national ﬁrms. The dummy R_D takes value 1 if
there are workers directly involved in R&D activities, while three variables signal if
ﬁrms have engaged in product, process and market innovation, respectively.
Table 17: Structural characteristics of firms by country
Country R&D Established Product Process Market Organisational High Use of 
before innovator innovator innovator innovator human flexible
1975 capital labour
contracts
Austria 0.59 0.47 0.59 0.58 0.44 0.51 0.25 0.78
France 0.59 0.41 0.44 0.38 0.3 0.27 0.32 0.74
Germany 0.71 0.48 0.50 0.40 0.29 0.43 0.22 0.78
Hungary 0.28 0.06 0.44 0.34 0.27 0.19 0.24 0.62
Italy 0.54 0.33 0.49 0.45 0.34 0.3 0.32 0.8
Spain 0.61 0.25 0.46 0.51 0.22 0.32 0.29 0.99
UK 0.61 0.34 0.58 0.47 0.44 0.24 0.23 0.82
Whole sample 0.6 0.36 0.49 0.44 0.31 0.32 0.28 0.81
Family Family Foreign Decentralised Performance- Quality Credit Credit
managed CEO group management based bonus certification requested obtained
Austria 0.28 0.71 0.14 0.32 0.48 0.52 0.11 0.10
France 0.18 0.49 0.12 0.23 0.44 0.53 0.06 0.04
Germany 0.26 0.73 0.06 0.32 0.49 0.65 0.08 0.07
Hungary 0.26 0.43 0.14 0.15 0.45 0.73 0.09 0.06
Italy 0.38 0.7 0.04 0.15 0.18 0.57 0.20 0.12
Spain 0.25 0.65 0.05 0.38 0.25 0.60 0.27 0.19
UK 0.13 0.54 0.17 0.37 0.47 0.63 0.07 0.06
Whole sample 0.25 0.62 0.09 0.28 0.37 0.60 0.14 0.10
Source: EFIGE dataset.
Finally, we exploit EFIGE data to compute the following additional variables: size class,
age (ie a dummy equal to 1 if the ﬁrm was established after 1975 and 0 otherwise),
foreign ownership (which is 1 if ﬁrms belong to foreign groups), competition (ie a
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binary variable which equals 1 if ﬁrms charge diﬀerent prices in markets with diﬀerent
degrees of competition), and use of flexible contracts or quality certificates. Appendix
1 provides a complete description of the identiﬁed variables, while Table 18 reports
for each country the share of ﬁrms in which a given characteristic is present.
5.4 Econometric evidence
Summing up, our analysis has shown that the ability of ﬁrms to compete successfully
in foreign markets crucially depends on their attaining a minimum performance
threshold in productivity, given the costs associated with international activities. To
this extent we have identiﬁed a good number of ﬁrms in our sample that, over the time
span considered in the analysis, have been able to either consistently remain above
such a critical threshold (some 2,850 large and well-capitalised ﬁrms), or to rise above
it it after 2008. In particular we have identiﬁed about 940 ‘switchers’, ie relatively small
(34 employees vs. a sample average of 126) but relatively well-capitalised ﬁrms rising
above the minimum performance threshold. We can now ﬁnally combine the retrieved
ﬁrms’ characteristics with the analysis of switching ﬁrms, in order to identify the
speciﬁc features of those ﬁrms (in terms of innovation, ﬁnancial structure, skills of
the workforce, organisation, etc) that are more likely to attain a sustained competitive
position on international markets. Or, in terms of our analysis, what ﬁrm characteristics
are signiﬁcantly associated with ﬁrms whose productivity dynamics are such that they
rise above the minimum performance threshold and thus become internationally
competitive.
To this extent, it is ﬁrst important to deal with potential self-selection resulting from
the fact that not every characteristic is observable for every ﬁrm. In particular, when
analysing the ﬁnancial performance of ﬁrms using the EFIGE data, we have noted that
some indexes, in particular ﬁnancial variables, were computable only for part of the
whole sample (mainly relatively large ﬁrms). This might induce a sample selection
that could bias our results. To deal with this, before moving to the regression analysis,
we have run a 2-step Heckman selection model where the (lagged) ﬁnancial variable
acts as a predictor of the internationalisation status, controlling for (lagged)
productivity as well as ﬁxed eﬀects (country, industry and ﬁrm size) in the ﬁrst stage.
Detailed results are reported in Appendix 3, and allow us to retain as signiﬁcant only
the FII and the CashR ﬁnancial variables, ruling out the others because they are not
signiﬁcantly associated with internationalisation after controlling for productivity in
the selection equation. In any case, we will also present results where those ﬁnancial
variables are not included in the estimation and are substituted by proxies of credit
constraints.
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Table 18 summarises the main regression results. The dependent variable is switch, a
dummy equal to 1 for our 942 previously identiﬁed switching ﬁrms. As a robustness
check, the 0 in the switch dummy, ie the control group, is deﬁned for two sets of ﬁrms:
the combined set of the 3,823 ﬁrms remaining below the critical cut-oﬀ plus the 1,010
ﬁrms that have moved below it over time; and only the set of ﬁrms remaining below the
cut-oﬀ. We then ran a probit speciﬁcation on this dependent variable, exploring the
probability that a given ﬁrm characteristic is signiﬁcantly associated with the fact of
being a switching ﬁrm vs. a non-switcher. As can be seen, we do not explicitly include
the internationalisation status in the estimation, as this is already endogenously
captured by the dependent variable switch through productivity growth from below to
above the critical internationalisation cut-oﬀ (see Table 13). It then follows that our
estimates are not plagued by a blatant endogeneity problem when linking ﬁrms’
characteristics to their ability to compete internationally.
In speciﬁcations from (1) to (4), we include the ﬁnancial indexes (FII and CashR) that
have survived the Heckman selection model, reported in Appendix 3. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms
that invest in R&D, that are in better ﬁnancial shape, with respect to both of the
indicators considered, and that belong to a foreign group, have a higher probability of
switching in all the speciﬁcations. Notice that we do not include both ﬁnancial
indicators in the same speciﬁcation in order to avoid multicollinearity problems.
Speciﬁcations (5) and (6) do not include ﬁnancial indexes and the ﬁnancial
component is taken into account by including the credit variables obtained from the
EFIGE dataset (ie credit_req and credit_obt). In this case too, ﬁrms that invest more in
R&D and have a quality certiﬁcation have a greater propensity to switch in both
speciﬁcations. Those that are family managed and required more credit have a lower
probability of rising above the critical performance cut-oﬀ. A higher probability of
switching is also associated to more human capital, to being part of a foreign group
and having productivity-based salaries (as shown in Table 18 column 6, using the
restricted control group). Finally, speciﬁcations (7) and (8) are estimated by sub -
stituting R&D activities (the input of the innovation function) with the three indicators
of innovation output (product_innov, process_innov and mkt_innov). As was the case
for the previous speciﬁcations, ﬁrms that have requested more credit or are family
managed are less likely to be switchers, while those that are able to generate process
innovation or have asked for quality certiﬁcation are more likely to be switchers. The
same is true for ﬁrms that are part of foreign group and link part of their salaries to the
performance of employees (only in last speciﬁcation, with the restricted control group).
As a last robustness check, we have run the set of regressions presented in Table 18
against the 1,811 ﬁrms, identiﬁed in Table 15, that display signiﬁcant growth rates,
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Table 18: Firms’ characteristics and switching probability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Move up=1 Move up=1 Move up=1 Move up=1 Move up=1 Move up=1 Move up=1 Move up=1
remain/ remain remain/ remain remain/ remain remain/ remain
drop below=0 drop below=0 drop below=0 drop below=0
below=0 below=0 below=0 below=0
r_d 0.135*** 0.142*** 0.149*** 0.152*** 0.128*** 0.139***
(0.0500) (0.0529) (0.0501) (0.0529) (0.0459) (0.0485)
age -0.0579 -0.0355 -0.0424 0.00304 -0.0260 0.0269 -0.0270 0.0254
(0.0512) (0.0548) (0.0512) (0.0547) (0.0472) (0.0504) (0.0472) (0.0504)
hk 0.0596 0.0791 0.0457 0.0591 0.0598 0.0845* 0.0714 0.0992**
(0.0509) (0.0543) (0.0514) (0.0549) (0.0473) (0.0505) (0.0473) (0.0505)
labour_flex -0.0421 -0.0521 -0.00824 -0.0245 -0.00658 -0.0183 -0.00468 -0.0153
(0.0653) (0.0693) (0.0661) (0.0703) (0.0601) (0.0639) (0.0601) (0.0638)
FII 0.238** 0.535***
(0.114) (0.124)
CashR 1.322*** 1.583***
(0.134) (0.146)
fam_managed -0.0768 -0.0917 -0.118** -0.142** -0.115** -0.129** -0.114** -0.130**
(0.0570) (0.0597) (0.0574) (0.0601) (0.0530) (0.0555) (0.0529) (0.0554)
fam_ceo -0.0699 -0.0847 -0.0714 -0.0947* -0.0570 -0.0823 -0.0576 -0.0823
(0.0524) (0.0558) (0.0527) (0.0560) (0.0481) (0.0511) (0.0482) (0.0511)
for_group 0.211* 0.310** 0.268** 0.363*** 0.154 0.244** 0.148 0.238**
(0.113) (0.129) (0.113) (0.129) (0.0989) (0.112) (0.0989) (0.112)
decentr_manag -0.00840 0.0211 0.000900 0.0138 -0.00883 0.00512 -0.00331 0.0121
(0.0552) (0.0593) (0.0556) (0.0595) (0.0508) (0.0544) (0.0507) (0.0542)
bonus 0.0614 0.0853 0.0363 0.0603 0.0738 0.115** 0.0744 0.116**
(0.0537) (0.0579) (0.0542) (0.0583) (0.0495) (0.0532) (0.0497) (0.0535)
qual_cert 0.0721 0.100* 0.0831* 0.114** 0.0769* 0.103** 0.0815* 0.109**
(0.0494) (0.0519) (0.0496) (0.0520) (0.0457) (0.0480) (0.0458) (0.0481)
comp -0.0431 -0.0174 -0.0234 8.88e-05 -0.0420 -0.0242 -0.0319 -0.0131
(0.0492) (0.0523) (0.0494) (0.0525) (0.0455) (0.0483) (0.0453) (0.0482)
credit_req -0.231** -0.278*** -0.225** -0.274***
(0.0989) (0.104) (0.0988) (0.104)
credit_obt 0.140 0.156 0.131 0.146
(0.113) (0.119) (0.113) (0.119)
product_innov 0.0641 0.0810
(0.0579) (0.0616)
process_innov 0.0801* 0.0824*
(0.0445) (0.0475)
mkt_innov -0.0815 -0.109
(0.0632) (0.0675)
Country fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm size Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,718 3,912 4,815 4,036 5,626 4,651 5,626 4,651
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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irrespective of their switching status. Results are reported in Appendix 4 and show
that, despite some foreseeable changes in signiﬁcance, no major qualitative
diﬀerences emerge between these speciﬁcations and the baseline presented above.
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6 Conclusions and policy
implications
What triggers competitiveness? This report has taken a systematic approach to
addressing this question. External competitiveness can be better explored through
analysis of ﬁrm-level data, because aggregate measures of competitiveness are
typically plagued by a number of potential biases that aﬀect their use as the basis for
policy conclusions.
When exploring competitiveness at the ﬁrm-level, we have shown how self-selection
into the various internationalisation statuses implies that international production
sharing is a signal of greater competitiveness both at ﬁrm and sector levels. To this
extent, we have argued that total factor productivity (TFP) is a better measure of
competitiveness than unit labour cost (ULC), often used in policy contexts (see
Appendix 5 for a detailed discussion). From the viewpoint of ﬁrms, greater
competitiveness gives access to a larger number of more complex options when it
comes to the design of international operations. From the viewpoint of industries,
greater competitiveness arises from the possibility to reallocate resources from less
to more productive ﬁrms. For both ﬁrms and industries, greater competitiveness arises
from the possibility to exploit a richer set of internationalisation strategies to deal with
the challenges and the opportunities of globalisation.
The report has also shown that ﬁrms become competitive in international markets
when their TFP rises above a minimum threshold (ie competitiveness requires a
quantum leap) that tends to be stable across countries but varies for diﬀerent
international activities. Exploiting the richness of a novel dataset (EFIGE), we have also
found that this quantum leap is triggered by speciﬁc ﬁrm characteristics related to
innovation (human capital and R&D intensity), ﬁnance (adequate capital in the form
of equity), managerial style (the use of performance-based salaries and a reduced
presence of managers belonging to the family if the ﬁrm is family owned), and
aﬃliation to a foreign group. Moreover, we have shown that, although the ﬁrms that
are able to move over time above the minimum productivity threshold are relatively
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small (an average of 34 employees vs. a sample average of 126), it is not size per se
that triggers competitiveness, but rather the ability to become more productive:
relatively small ﬁrms, if endowed with certain characteristics, are more likely to grow,
and for these reasons are picked up by our exercise. Through time, these ﬁrms will
however reach the size of their already large and internationally competitive
counterparts, thus ending up larger than the average domestic ﬁrm (140 vs. 31
employees). The latter will remain small and relatively less competitive precisely
because they are not endowed with the characteristics that enable them to become
more productive.
Finally, the report has shown that these eﬀects do not necessarily depend on speciﬁc
countries or industries, as they are typically related to systematic features of ﬁrm
characteristics that are in general ignored in the policy debate on competitiveness.
Countries and sectors might certainly display diﬀerences in competitiveness to the
extent that ﬁrms within them are relatively more or less endowed with those speciﬁc
characteristics identiﬁed in this report, leading to greater productivity growth and
hence greater external competitiveness.
From a policy viewpoint, our ﬁndings have several implications:
• Deﬁnitions and measures of competitiveness on which policymakers base their
decisions have to be context-speciﬁc. In particular, we show that, if the aim of
policies is to foster a country’s ability to exchange the goods and services in which
a country is abundant for the goods and services that in the same country are
scarce, the ultimately ﬁrm-driven nature of this process is such that traditional
aggregate measures of competitiveness are subject to a number of biases and are
thus likely to lead to imprecise policies, unless they are complemented by more
disaggregated information on how ﬁrms actually work and react to incentives.
• The single best predictor of a ﬁrm’s ability to successfully compete in international
markets is its total factor productivity. Hence, ﬁrm productivity growth and not
internationalisation per se should be the main policy objective.
• The promotion of ﬁrm productivity should go beyond the traditional exercise of
educated guesswork around a black box. In this respect, we have shown that ﬁrm
productivity growth is triggered by the combination of very precise ﬁrm attributes
relating to innovation, ﬁnance, human resources, management and ownership.
These attributes can be nurtured, for example, through the design of incentives for
R&D, of more direct links between wages and productivity within national wage-
48
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bargaining systems, of capital markets less dependent on banking ﬁnance and
more favourable to the development of equity ﬁnance, and the availability of
adequate skills in the workforce.
• Small is not beautiful per se. Small is beautiful if it grows, and growth does not
happen when smallness is not accompanied by the right set of other ﬁrm
characteristics. In this respect, the key question for SME policy should not be how
to help small ﬁrms survive, but rather how to make small ﬁrms adopt the right
attitudes towards innovation, ﬁnance, human resources, management and
ownership, promoting not only their survival but also their growth.
• Firms’ attitudes are not immutable but are rather shaped by policies. Hence, the
promotion of productivity growth and competitiveness should go beyond the logic
of mere compensation (subsidies), targeting instead the speciﬁc institutional
aspects that make ﬁrms inclined to acquire the ‘right’ set of characteristics, beyond
the worn-out generic mantra of ‘ﬂexibilities vs. rigidities’.
• Last but not least, a growing concern among European citizens and politicians is
that society should have other objectives beyond the mere promotion of the ability
to exchange goods and services. Sometimes these other objectives (eg social
cohesion) may create a temporary trade-oﬀ with productivity growth and
competitiveness-related policies. When that is the case, the opportunity cost of
those alternative objectives in terms of foregone productivity should be evaluated
in order to assess the relevant trade-oﬀs in a transparent (and thus eﬃcient) way.
When societies pursue complex objectives, it is even more important for the
policymaker to complement the standard aggregate measures of productivity with
more disaggregated measures that better capture the way people and ﬁrms actually
behave and react to economic (dis)incentives.
To summarise, because competitiveness is the cause rather than the consequence of
ﬁrm internationalisation, EU policies promoting internationalisation per se would hardly
aﬀect competitiveness. However, policies that artiﬁcially reduce the ability of
competitive ﬁrms to trade, outsource and invest abroad would also reduce their ability
to reach their full potential. As a result, rather than focusing on the internationalisation
of ﬁrms, successful policies should instead foster an economic environment in which
ﬁrms have the incentive to acquire the characteristics that, as we have shown, are
associated with productivity growth.
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Appendix 1: Additional data and
variable description
Distribution of ﬁrms by country and size class
Class size AUT FRA GER HUN ITA SPA UK Total
Employees (10-19) 132 1,001 701 149 1,040 1,036 635 4,694
Employees (20-49) 168 1,150 1,135 176 1,407 1,244 805 6,085
Employees (50-249) 97 608 793 118 429 406 519 2,970
Employees(over250) 46 214 306 45 145 146 108 1,010
Total 443 2,973 2,935 488 3,021 2,832 2,067 14,759
Distribution of ﬁrms by country and sector
Sector AUT FRA GER HUN ITA SPA UK Total
15 32 212 350 62 238 463 147 1,504
17 8 118 77 7 196 46 52 504
18 5 55 17 17 109 50 42 295
19 0 32 13 4 115 47 10 221
20 21 93 103 17 88 212 89 623
21 10 83 62 16 71 27 47 316
22 34 148 215 27 105 100 208 837
24 5 102 95 20 108 121 104 555
25 22 226 192 40 169 148 122 919
26 18 153 94 30 167 163 56 681
27 13 68 58 7 76 68 54 344
28 70 839 510 101 611 580 301 3,012
29 48 249 503 68 381 305 208 1,762
31 20 121 134 19 152 66 124 636
32 5 94 56 9 49 25 101 339
33 15 58 192 6 71 25 80 447
34 6 73 41 11 47 64 33 275
35 2 16 20 3 33 42 21 137
36 5 16 172 18 211 258 258 938
Total 339 2,756 2,904 482 2,997 2,810 2,057 14,345
Note: Sector 15 is merged with sector 16. Sector 31 is merged with sector 30.
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Margins of trade across international activities and countries
A) Extensive margin
EFIGE CROSS-COUNTRY REPORT APPENDIX 1
Note: share of ﬁrms active in a given international status over total number of ﬁrms.
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Note: percentage of each ﬁrm’s turnover derived by a given international activity.
B) Intensive margin
EFIGE CROSS-COUNTRY REPORT APPENDIX 1
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Deﬁnition of variables used in the regressions
Variable used Definition
Exporter Dummy for exporter - wide definition: firm is direct exporter in 2008 or has
been actively exporting in years before 2008. 
Importer of materials Dummy for importer of intermediate goods in 2008 or before.
Importer of services Dummy for importer of services in 2008 or before.
Active outsourcer Dummy for the firm that has production activity contracts and agreements
abroad.
Passive outsourcer Dummy for the firm that has sold some produced-to-order goods to foreign
clients.
FDI Dummy for firm running at least part of its production activity in another
country via direct investments.
Global exporter Dummy for firm exporting to China or India or other Asian countries or USA or
Canada or Central or South America.
Active abroad At least one of the above variables takes value 1.
Total factor productivity (TFP) Solow residual of a Cobb-Douglas production function estimated following the
semi-parametric algorithm proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), at the
firm level, 2002-2008
Labour productivity Added value per employee, at the firm level, 2002-08 (Amadeus)
Unit labour cost Labour compensation over added value, at the firm level, 2002-08 (Amadeus)
Vertical share (Vs) Ratio of the value of intermediate goods imported from abroad over the value
of total output for each industry, based on country-specific I/O tables, 2001-
07 (Eurostat)
r_d Dummy for R&D: firm employs more than 0 employees to R&D activities
age Dummy for firms established before or in 1975
product_innov Dummy for firms that carried out any product innovation in years 2007-09
process_innov Dummy for firms that carried out any process innovation in years 2007-09
mkt_innov Dummy for firms that carried out new to the market innovation
organisational_innov Dummy for firms where product/process innovation implied organisational
innovation
ln_k_l Capital intensity as natural logarithm of capital labour ratio
hk Dummy for human capital: firm has a higher share of graduate employees with
respect to the national average share of graduates
labour_flex Dummy for labour flexibility: firm uses part-time employment or fixed-term
contracts
credit_req Dummy for credit request: firm requested some more credit in the last year
credit_obt Dummy for credit obtained: firm requested and obtained extra credit in the last
year
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fam_managed Dummy for family managed: firm share of managers related to the controlling
family is higher than the national average 
fam_ceo Dummy for family CEO: the CEO is the individual who controls the firm or a
member of the controlling family
for_group Dummy for foreign group: firm belongs to a foreign group
decentr_management Dummy for decentralised management: managers can take autonomous
decisions in some business areas
bonus Dummy for bonus: the managers are rewarded with bonus
qual_cert Dummy for quality certification: the firm has gone through any quality
certification process during the last year
comp Dummy for competition from abroad: the firm has competitors abroad
switch Dummy for switcher firms: firm’s average TFP was below the cut-off (7th
decile) in period 2001-07, and above the cut-off in 2008-09
Dyn Four productivity dynamics with respect to cut-off: remain below, move below,
move above (switch), remain above.
TFP growth Dummy variable identifying those firms whose difference in the average TFP
between the time spans 2006-09 and 2001-05 lays in the fourth quartile of
the resulting distribution.
EFIGE CROSS-COUNTRY REPORT APPENDIX 1
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Appendix 2: Levinsohn and
Petrin estimation technique
Let yt denote (the log of) a ﬁrm’s output in a Cobb-Douglas production function of the
form
yt = β0 + βllt + βlkt + βmmt + ωt + δt (*)
where lt and mt denote the (freely available) labour and intermediate inputs in logs,
respectively, and kt is the logarithm of the state variable capital. The error term has
two components: δt, which is uncorrelated with input choices, and ωt, a productivity
shock unobserved by the econometrician, but observed by the ﬁrm. Since the ﬁrm
adapts its input choice as soon as it observes ωt, inputs turn out to be correlated with
the error term of the regression, and thus OLS estimates of production functions yield
inconsistent results.
To correct for this problem, (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003), from now on LP, assume the
demand for intermediate inputs mt (eg material costs) depends on the ﬁrm’s capital kt
and productivity ωt, and show that the same demand is monotonically increasing in ωt.
Thus, it is possible for them to write ωt as ωt = ωt(kt;mt), expressing the unobserved
productivity shock ωt as a function of two observables, kt and mt.
To allow for identiﬁcation of ωt, LP follow Olley and Pakes (1996) and assume it to
follow a Markov process of the form ωt = E[ωt|E[δt +ϑt|kt] = 0] + ϑt where ϑtis a
change in productivity uncorrelated with kt. Through these assumptions it is then
possible to rewrite equation (*) as
yt = βllt + ϕ(kt;mt) + δt (**)
where ϕ(kt;mt) = β0 + βlkt + βmmt + ωt(kt;mt). By substituting a third-order poly -
nomial approximation in kt and mt in place of ωt(kt;mt), LP show that it is possible to
consistently estimate the parameter ϕt and βt in equation (**).
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For any candidate value βk* and βm* , one can then predict ωt for all periods t, since 
ωt = ϕt –βk*kt –βm* mt and hence, using these predicted values, estimate E[ωt|ωt–1].
It then follows that the residual generated by βk* and βm* with respect to yt can be
written as 
δt + ϑt = yt –βllt –βk*kt –βm* mt – E[ωt|ωt–1] (***)
Equation (***) can then be used to identify βk* and βm* using the following two
instruments: if the capital stock kt is determined by the previous period’s investment
decision, it then does not respond to productivity shocks at time t and thus 
E[δt +ϑt|kt] = 0; also, if the last period’s level of intermediate inputs mt is uncorrelated
with the error period at time t (which is plausible if for instance one takes material
costs as a proxy for intermediate inputs), then E[δt +ϑt|mt–1] = 0. 
Through these two moment conditions, it is then possible to ﬁnd a consistent and
unbiased for βk* and βm* by solving the following problem
min(βk*, βm* )≡Σh[Σt(δt +ϑt)Zht]2 (****)
with Zt≡ (kt + mt–1) and h indexing the elements of Zt.
EFIGE CROSS-COUNTRY REPORT APPENDIX 2
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Appendix 3: Financial variables
and internationalisation 
Heckman selection model
(1) (2)
Variables Active abroad Exporter
L_FII 0.0675** 0.0671**
(0.0316) (0.0303)
L_tfp_va 0.295*** 0.325***
(0.0456) (0.0472)
L_CashR 0.0682* 0.298***
(0.0403) (0.0480)
L_tfp_va 0.258*** 0.325***
(0.0461) (0.0472)
L_IFP 0.000291 0.00161
(0.0289) (0.0272)
L_tfp_va 0.343*** 0.384***
(0.0456) (0.0474)
L_CurrR 0.0111 0.0117
(0.00785) (0.00757)
L_tfp_va 0.242*** 0.271***
(0.0426) (0.0443)
L_LR 0.0239 0.0252
(0.0281) (0.0271)
L_tfp_va 0.256*** 0.289***
(0.0425) (0.0444)
L_LevR -0.00175 -0.00142
(0.00553) (0.00541)
L_tfp_va 0.311*** 0.336***
(0.0429) (0.0445)
NOTE: ﬁrst stage (not reported) uses lagged TFP + ﬁxed eﬀects; second stage uses lagged ﬁnancial variable +
residual of ﬁrst stage + ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix 4: TFP growth and ﬁrm
characteristics 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TFP TFP TFP TFP TFP TFP TFP TFP
growth growth growth growth growth growth growth growth
Variables Grow=1 Grow=1 Grow=1 Grow=1 Grow=1 Grow=1 Grow=1 Grow=1
Remain/ Remain Remain/ Remain Remain/ Remain Remain/ Remain
drop below=0 below=0 drop below=0 below=0 drop below=0 below=0 drop below=0 below=0
r_d 0.0858* 0.0954* 0.111** 0.122** 0.109** 0.130***
(0.0470) (0.0495) (0.0463) (0.0487) (0.0433) (0.0455)
age -0.245*** -0.249*** -0.241*** -0.229*** -0.252*** -0.236*** -0.249*** -0.232***
(0.0503) (0.0536) (0.0496) (0.0528) (0.0463) (0.0493) (0.0463) (0.0494)
hk 0.0620 0.0781 0.0548 0.0614 0.0516 0.0664 0.0533 0.0670
(0.0485) (0.0515) (0.0482) (0.0511) (0.0451) (0.0480) (0.0450) (0.0480)
labour_flex -0.0121 -0.00845 0.0116 0.00126 -0.0129 -0.00753 -0.00987 -0.00240
(0.0629) (0.0666) (0.0625) (0.0661) (0.0579) (0.0614) (0.0579) (0.0614)
FII -0.301*** -0.111
(0.109) (0.118)
CashR 0.678*** 0.788***
(0.130) (0.140)
fam_managed -0.0130 -0.0104 -0.0574 -0.0620 -0.0446 -0.0408 -0.0474 -0.0431
(0.0525) (0.0549) (0.0519) (0.0542) (0.0487) (0.0509) (0.0487) (0.0509)
fam_ceo -0.0958* -0.127** -0.120** -0.151*** -0.103** -0.122** -0.103** -0.123**
(0.0501) (0.0529) (0.0494) (0.0521) (0.0460) (0.0486) (0.0460) (0.0486)
for_group 0.132 0.209 0.177 0.282** 0.0999 0.164 0.0976 0.161
(0.117) (0.133) (0.117) (0.132) (0.104) (0.117) (0.104) (0.117)
decentr_manag 0.0413 0.0743 0.0509 0.0750 0.0699 0.0940* 0.0753 0.0998*
(0.0528) (0.0563) (0.0522) (0.0554) (0.0483) (0.0515) (0.0482) (0.0514)
bonus 0.0402 0.0716 0.0271 0.0621 0.0297 0.0609 0.0263 0.0559
(0.0528) (0.0565) (0.0524) (0.0559) (0.0488) (0.0523) (0.0490) (0.0525)
qual_cert 0.0137 0.0442 -0.00417 0.0249 0.00905 0.0372 0.00777 0.0355
(0.0469) (0.0492) (0.0462) (0.0485) (0.0433) (0.0455) (0.0434) (0.0457)
comp -0.0545 -0.0205 -0.0434 -0.0147 -0.0531 -0.0276 -0.0509 -0.0254
(0.0469) (0.0495) (0.0464) (0.0489) (0.0434) (0.0459) (0.0433) (0.0458)
credit_req -0.0483 -0.0921 -0.0432 -0.0869
(0.0876) (0.0921) (0.0876) (0.0921)
credit_obt -0.0169 -0.0157 -0.0248 -0.0252
(0.101) (0.107) (0.101) (0.107)
product_innov 0.00263 0.0158
(0.0564) (0.0597)
process_innov 0.0401 0.0452
(0.0424) (0.0451)
mkt_innov 0.123** 0.136**
(0.0611) (0.0649)
Country fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm size Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,718 3,912 4,815 4,036 5,626 4,651 5,626 4,651
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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30. As previously discussed, TFP is retrieved as the Solow residual from the estimation of a production function: hence,
the higher the (deﬂated) value-added keeping constant inputs, the higher the TFP. 
Appendix 5: ULC and its limits
Measures of TFP are generally considered the most appropriate indicator of ﬁrm
performance by researchers, because they tend to be correlated with proﬁts, markups
and size. However, as TFP measures are computationally intensive to calculate, and
suﬀer from a potentially signiﬁcant aggregation biases when calculated at the industry
or country level, policy-related papers tend to use ULC-based measures when
assessing competitiveness, especially at the aggregate level. We recall that ULC at
time t for ﬁrm i is easily derived as:
Cost of Employeesit
ULCit = —————————
Added Valueit
As a result, as for TFP, the ULC measure is such that any increase in added value would
translate into a higher level ﬁrm competitiveness30. However, an increase in the cost
of employees would reduce a ﬁrm’s competitiveness measured via ULC, while TFP-
based measures would be unaﬀected (TFP depends on the number of employees, not
on their cost).
Now, imagine that a given ﬁrm produces higher quality products thanks to a diﬀerent
workforce organisation (eg workers spend more time on research and development
activities, or simply are more skilled). In terms of TFP, the unobserved (higher) quality
would likely result in higher ﬁrm-level prices, and hence in a positive bias in (deﬂated)
added value, which would go in the same direction as the estimated TFP. In terms of
ULC, however, things are less straightforward: the diﬀerent organisation of the
workforce of the ‘high-quality’ ﬁrm might be associated with a higher total wage bill
and thus, to the extent that this is not perfectly reﬂected in total added value, in a
higher (rather than lower) unit labour cost.
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This idea is consistent with the results reported in Table 12, where TFP and ULC premia
were compared for diﬀerent internationalisation activities. Further evidence is also
provided by Figure A5.1, showing how the relationship between TFP deciles and the
probability of exporting is relatively more linear with respect to the one observed
between the latter and ULC deciles. 
Figure A5.1: Distribution of exporters by productivity deciles
In order to provide some evidence supporting our claim that unobserved (higher)
quality might bias the relationship between ULC and export probabilities, we have
exploited the wealth of information existing in EFIGE and have proxied ‘quality’ at the
ﬁrm-level with R&D activities (see Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Ang and Madsen,
2011). We have then empirically tested the following model at the ﬁrm level:
Exporti = α + βR & Di + γULCi + δULC * R & Di + ηi⎯FE + εi
Where Export is a dummy variable taking value 1 if ﬁrm i exported in 2008 or before;
R & Di is a dummy indicating whether the ﬁrm allocated at least one employee to
R&D activities in 2008; ULC is the natural logarithm of ULC; and ULC*R & Di is an
interaction term between the two variables; FE is a matrix of country and sector ﬁxed
eﬀects. The coeﬃcient of interest is δ: if signiﬁcant, it indicates a diﬀerent eﬀect of an
increase in ULC on the probability of exporting for the sub-samples of ﬁrms that do
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31. Obtained as the sum of the coeﬃcients estimated respectively for ULC and for the interaction term.
R&D (our proxy for ‘high-quality’ ﬁrms) vs. those that do not. Column 2 of Table A5.1
shows the results of a probit estimation of equation (1), whereas column 1 provides
the results on the model estimated without the interaction term; columns 3 and 4
report the results of robustness checks, in which ULC has been replaced by TFP.
Table A5.1: Probit on exporting
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Exporter Exporter Exporter Exporter
R&D 0.606*** 0.691*** 0.584*** 0.586***
(0.0301) (0.0442) (0.0339) (0.0353)
ULC -0.281*** -0.420***
(0.0513) (0.0738)
ULC*R&D 0.264***
(0.101)
TFP 0.254*** 0.248***
(0.0360) (0.0529)
TFP*R&D 0.0102
(0.0673)
Constant 0.446 0.404 0.505 0.503
(0.399) (0.401) (0.396) (0.396)
Observations 9,053 9,053 7,259 7,259
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
As expected, and in line with the literature, in both speciﬁcations (1) and (2) ULC
aﬀects negatively the probability of exporting, while R&D activity is associated with a
greater likelihood of exporting. The interaction term in column (2), instead, exhibits a
positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, indicating a less negative net eﬀect31 of ULC on
the probability of exporting for those ﬁrms involved in R&D activities. Or, in other words,
once ‘purged’ from the eﬀect of quality (as proxied by R&D), the sign and signiﬁcance
of ULC as a predictor of the probability of export increases dramatically (from 0.28 to
0.42). The role of R&D instead, while remaining signiﬁcant, does not seem to aﬀect, as
expected, the ability of TFP to predict the export status of a ﬁrm (columns 3 and 4 of
Table A5.1).
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32. Our results are coherent with Wakelin (1997), who shows that innovating ﬁrms export higher quality goods and are
thus less likely to be adversly aﬀected by a high unit labour cost.
Figure A5.2 provides a visual representation of the analysis conducted above. We plot
the probability of exporting (estimated as described above) alongside the natural
logarithm of ULC. The two slopes highlighted illustrate the coeﬃcients estimated for the
ﬁrms with R&D activities, higher and ﬂatter, and for those that do not, lower and steeper.
This conﬁrms the idea for that for ﬁrms with R&D activities, an increase in the ULC is not
necessarily aﬀecting their ability of exporting (their competitiveness does not depend
exclusively on the competitive price of the goods sold), whereas for those ﬁrms with
no R&D activities, an increase in ULC translates more strongly into a reduction in the
probability of exporting, conﬁrming the idea that quality indeed matters32.
Figure A5.2: Relationship between ULC and export by R&D activity
Of course, one may argue that R&D is only part of the broader concept of ‘quality’; other
measures could capture a similar pattern. We have thus estimated the model using
diﬀerent indicators of ‘quality’. More precisely, we used indicators of human capital (a
dummy taking value 1 for those ﬁrms with a share of graduates above the national
average), perceived quality (considering those ﬁrms that indicate that they are in the
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top decile in terms of quality of the goods sold in the respective markets), innovation
and training of employees. However, the results do not hold, with the coeﬃcient of the
interaction term being not signiﬁcant in the majority of cases. The reason for this can
be twofold. First, R&D data in our database is of a better quality than the information
available to construct the other indicators we mentioned. Second, R&D could be indeed
capturing a diﬀerent attitude of the managers of the ﬁrm, less related to the
speciﬁcities of ﬁrms and sectors.
By and large, the above evidence indicates that ULC is not only a measure of a ﬁrm’s
eﬃciency but might also be related to the ‘quality’ of the labour force. The same issue
does not aﬀect TFP, which captures only ﬁrm eﬃciency. As such, the latter should be
considered a ‘cleaner’ measure of ﬁrm performance, especially when external
dimensions of competitiveness (internationalisation) are considered.
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contribute to the quality of economic policymaking in Europe through open, facts-
based and policy-relevant research, analysis and discussion.
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hensive analysis and policy recommendations on central questions of the moment.
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other organisations, essays and books.
Bruegel’s research is independent and does not represent the views of its board 
or members. For a full picture of Bruegel’s activities and publications, visit
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The triggers of competitiveness:
The EFIGE cross-country report
There is a pressing need for Europe to grow out of the crisis, meaning that
Europe needs to become more competitive, enabling it to capture growth cur-
rently taking place mainly in emerging markets. But what are the triggers of
competitiveness? The EFIGE project, led by Bruegel, takes a fresh look by
inquiring into the determinants of firm-level international performance – focus-
ing on external competitiveness. In the competitiveness debate, it is crucial to
understand not only the macroeconomic challenge, but also to find the right
micro-level triggers that will generate growth and exports.
The authors identify firm-level total factor productivity as a major determinant of
growth and exports. Human capital, research, equity finance and performance-
based incentives for employees also play their parts. Moreover, size matters
and large firms typically are much better exporters than their smaller counter-
parts. This report builds on previous EFIGE research and studies in depth firm
performance in seven countries (Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy,
Spain and the United Kingdom) to identify the triggers of competitiveness. 
Bruegel is a European think tank devoted to international economics. It is
supported by European governments and international corporations.
Bruegel’s aim is to contribute to the quality of economic policymaking in
Europe through open, fact-based and policy-relevant research, analysis and
discussion.
EFIGE (European Firms in a Global Economy) is a project to examine the pat-
tern of internationalisation of European firms. The research leading to this
report has received funding from the European Union's Seventh Framework
Programme, and from UniCredit Group.
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